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ABSTRACT
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) cannot be justified because they free public funds.  When
PPPs are desirable because the private sector is more efficient, the contract that optimally trades
demand risk, user-fee distortions and the opportunity cost of public funds is characterized by a
minimum revenue guarantee and a cap on the firm’s revenues.  Yet income guarantees and
revenue sharing arrangements observed in practice differ fundamentally from those suggested by
the optimal contract.  The optimal contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with
realistic informational requirements; and risk allocation under the optimal contract suggests that
PPPs are closer to public provision than to privatization.
JEL Codes: H21, H54, L51, R42
Keywords: Bundling, cost of public funds, subsidies, minimum revenue guarantees, revenue
and profit caps, Demsetz auctions1 Introduction and motivation
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) increasingly substitute public provision, for a wide array of
services and infrastructures that require large up-front investments, such as highways, water
and sewerage, bridges, trains, sea and airports, jails, hospitals and schools.2,3 A typical PPP
bundles investment and service provision into a single contract. For a period of 20 to 30 years
a private concessionaire controls the assets, manages the service and collects user fees. At the
end of the franchise the asset reverts to government ownership.4 The economics of PPPs are
still imperfectly understood and practice has run ahead of theory. Some practitioners and gov-
ernments claim that PPPs relieve strained budgets and free public funds. Others believe that
PPPs are appealing because ﬁnance, investment and management is delegated to a private
concessionaire—PPPs are believed to represent temporary privatization. Overall, the experi-
ence with infrastructure PPPs has been somewhat disappointing.5 For example, contracts are
often renegotiated, changing the original terms in favor of the concessionaires (Guasch, 2004).
The reasons seems to be that most PPP projects are subject to large, exogenous demand uncer-
tainty (renegotiations usually occur when demand is lower than predicted) and, perhaps, faulty
contracting. Indeed, an array of risk sharing arrangements has emerged in practice, but there is
no benchmark to compare them to.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the normative analysis of PPPs by answering
two questions. First, what is the structure of the optimal risk-sharing contract between govern-
ment and concessionaire when there is substantial exogenous demand risk? Second, what is
the impact of PPP’s on the government budget?
In our basic model a risk neutral government contracts a risk-averse concessionaire to ﬁ-
2The surge in PPPs is reﬂected in the ﬁnancial press. For example, articles in the Financial Times mentioning
thisconceptincreasedtwenty-foldoverthelastdecade, from50in1995 to1,153in2004. Also, inBritainabout14%
of public investment is now done under the so-called Private Finance Initiative (Bennet and Iossa, 2006).
3The case of PPPs in the transportation sector is particularly compelling. Growing congestion, budgetary prob-
lems, and a major decrease in toll collection costs have led more than 20 U.S. states to pass legislation permitting
the operation of public-private partnerships to build, ﬁnance and operate toll-roads, bridges and tunnels. See
“Paying on the Highway to Get Out of First Gear.” New York Times, April 28, 2005. Congestion costs in the top U.S.
metro areas have grown steadily, reaching $63.1 billion in 2003, 60% higher (in real terms) than a decade earlier
(Schrank and Lomax, 2005).
4There are several deﬁnitions for “Public-Private Partnership”. In this paper we take it to mean an infrastructure
project such that (i) assets are controlled by a private ﬁrm for a (possibly inﬁnite) term; (ii) both the private ﬁrm
and the government are residual claimants, often in ambiguous terms due to contract incompleteness; and (iii)
there is substantial public planning involved. We use the term “concession” as synonymous to PPP .
5By “disappointing” we mean a signiﬁcant gap between expectations and actual experience with PPPs. This
does not mean that traditional provision would have done better. For an early evaluation of infrastructure PPPs,
see Economic Planning Advisory Commission (EPAC) (1995), Final Report of the Private Infrastructure Task Force,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. For more recent evaluations, see Engel, Fischer and Gale-
tovic (2003) and Grimsey and Lewis (2007).
1nance, build and operate a project.6 The project requires a large up-front investment I, has no
operating costs and the demand for its services is perfectly inelastic, exogenous and stochas-
tic.7 The concessionaire can be compensated with a combination of subsidies and user fees.
We allow the concession term and the size of the subsidy to vary with demand realizations. In
order to model the link between the project and the public ﬁnances, we assume that raising $1
in taxes costs λ>1 dollars to society.
Our ﬁrst result is that the usual justiﬁcation for PPPs—relieving public budgets and substi-
tuting cheap private funding for distortionary tax ﬁnance—is incorrect. The intuition is clear in
the case of a PPP in which the concessionaire receives revenues solely from user fees. An addi-
tional $1 invested by the concessionaire saves society λ−1 > 0 current dollars in distortionary
taxes. But the concessionaire must be compensated for the additional investment by extending
the concession term to collect an additional $1 in present value. Since the government could
have used this future revenue to reduce the distortions created by taxes, the opportunity cost of
relinquishing the future $1 in user fees is the shadow cost of public funds, λ. Thus there is no
gain in present value (a similar argument holds if investment is ﬁnanced with subsidies to be
paid in the future).
Having shown that private ﬁnancing cannot by itself justify a PPP raises the question of
whether there exist other reasons to use PPPs. Hart (2003) argued that the main characteristic
of these contractual arrangements is that they bundle investment expenditure with life-cycle
operation costs.8 A PPP achieves the most efﬁcient mix of these costs and is therefore superior
to conventional methods of infrastructure provision when cost cutting increases social welfare.
In some environments cost cutting leads to lower service quality, and conventional provision
may be welfare enhancing.
In this paper we study a different aspect of having the same ﬁrm build and operate the
project, namely that the ﬁrm can be remunerated directly with the user fees it collects during
the contract. Experience shows that user fees normally make up a large fraction of the rev-
enues of the PPP concessionaires. Is there a reason for preferring user fees over subsidies as
compensation for the concessionaire? We show that if subsidy spending is less efﬁcient than
private spending (for example, because private ﬁrms have less overhead than the government
bureaucracy), reducing subsidies and replacing them with user fee revenue increases produc-
tive efﬁciency by reducing the size of the bureaucracy. Bundling allows this by substituting user
6As in principal-agent models, the less risk averse party —in our case the government— is assumed to be risk
neutral. Assumingariskaverseﬁrmisashortcutforagencyproblemspreventingriskdiversiﬁcation, seeAppendix
D in the working paper version of Engel et al. (2001) for a model along these lines. Martimort and Pouyet (2006)
also assume a risk-averse concessionaire.
7Some of these assumptions are relaxed later in the paper.
8See also Bennet and Iossa (2006), Bentz et al. (2005) and Martimort and Pouyet (2006).
2fees received directly by the concessionaire for subsidies, which are intermediated by the gov-
ernment through the public budget. The relative inefﬁciency of government is not sufﬁcient
to prefer PPPs over conventional provision, since the choice depends on how bundling affects
incentives. Surprisingly, however, fromthepointofviewofoptimalcontracts, theeffectscanbe
neatly separated. On the one hand, when investment and life cycle costs are linked, bundling
alters incentives, and this affects whether a PPP is preferred over conventional provision of the
project. On the other hand, conditional on a PPP being preferred, the intertemporal link does
notaffectthestructureoftheoptimalrisk-sharingcontract. Therestofthepaperisasystematic
exploration of the structure of the optimal contract.
In order to model the inefﬁciencies that the government incurs in when paying out subsi-
dies, we assume that achieving $1 of useful investment costs $1 in the private sector but ζ > 1
dollars if ﬁnanced with a subsidy. This means that ζ−1 is a measure of the relative inefﬁciency
of the bureaucracy when making transfers. Hence the opportunity cost of transferring an ad-
ditional dollar to the concessionaire with user fees is λ, while it is λζ when using subsidies. It
follows that the planner will always prefer to remunerate the concessionaire with user fees.
Somewhat less obviously, we ﬁnd that sometimes the optimal contract trades off insurance
with the desire to subsidize as little as possible. What is the economics behind this tradeoff?
Assume for a moment that user fees and subsidies are perfect substitutes at the margin (ζ=1).
Then it can be easily seen that the combination of user fees and subsidies paid to the conces-
sionaire is irrelevant, as long as they add up to I in all states. That is, it is optimal to give full
insurance to the risk-averse party.
Next consider how the structure of the optimal contract changes when ζ > 1. First note
that in the contract with full insurance described above the planner will substitute user fees
for subsidies whenever possible. For this reason, in states where the present value of user fee
revenue for an indeﬁnite term exceeds I, the concession should end in ﬁnite time and revenues
should be capped at I. By contrast, in states such that the present value of user fee revenue falls
short of I, full insurance can be maintained only by subsidizing the difference; in these states it
is optimal to let the concession run indeﬁnitely to minimize subsidy payments.
The planner can do better than providing full insurance. By slightly reducing the conces-
sionaire’s revenue in low-demand states to m < I it can save λζ per dollar in lower subsidies.
This must be compensated by slightly lengthening the term of the concession in high-demand
states to increase user fee revenues to M > I, at the smaller cost of λ per dollar. The conces-
sionaire bears some risk, but for values of m and M close to I this effect is of second-order
compared to the savings in resources. The process of reducing expenditures on costly subsidies
by decreasing m and increasing M ceases only when the marginal cost savings are equal to the
cost of incremental risk for the concessionaire.
3This analysis suggests, and we prove it formally in this paper, that the optimal contract is
characterized by two thresholds: a minimum revenue guarantee m and a revenue cap M. De-
mand states where the present value of user fee revenue exceeds M in ﬁnite time are called
high demand states. Those states in which user fee revenue is lower than m even in an inﬁ-
nite franchise are referred to as low demand states. The concession lasts indeﬁnitely in low
demand states and subsidies are paid to ensure that the concessionaire receives m. In contrast,
the concession ends in ﬁnite time in high demand states, and revenues are capped at M. Fi-
nally, in states of demand for which user fees in an inﬁnite length franchise lie between m and
M (which we denote by intermediate demand states), the concession lasts indeﬁnitely, but the
concessionaire receives no subsidies.
Of course, some projects enjoy high demand in all states (i.e., in all states the present value
of user fee revenue exceeds I), and only the revenue cap M is relevant. In those cases conces-
sionaires receives full insurance, and the term of the concession is ﬁnite. On the other hand,
there are also low-demand projects (i.e., in all states the present value of user fee revenue falls
short of I). In that case, only the minimum revenue guarantee is relevant, the concession lasts
indeﬁnitely in all states, and the concessionaire receives a subsidy that allows him full insur-
ance. The economic reasoning is similar in the two cases: the source of marginal revenue for
the concessionaire is the same across states of demand (i.e., either user fees or subsidies) so
there is no wedge that makes it worthwhile to expose him to risk. In contrast, intermediate-
demand projects are distinguished because in some states the present value of user fee revenue
exceeds I, while in others it falls short. Thus, if the concessionaire were totally insured, the
source of marginal revenue would come from user fees in some cases (with associated distor-
tion λ per dollar) while in the others it would be derived from a subsidy (at a marginal cost of
λζ). The existence of a wedge in the social cost of the marginal dollar between states makes it
worthwhile to have the concessionaire bear some risk.
Next, we describe how the optimal risk sharing contract can be implemented with a com-
petitive auction. The government announces the probability density of user fee revenue that
characterizes demand uncertainty and the parameters that summarize the cost of public funds
and the inefﬁciency of subsidies (λ and ζ). Firms offer bids on a minimum revenue guarantee
m andarevenuecap M, andtheconcessionisassignedtotheﬁrmwhosebidsminimizeascor-
ing function that depends only on m and M. This means that implementation of the auction
does not require knowledge of the cost of up-front investment I, nor the ﬁrms’ degree of risk
aversion.
We next address the issue of the robustness of the structure of the optimal contract to weak-
ening the assumptions. In one extension we include operation and maintenance costs, and
price responsive demand. We ﬁnd that user fees should be set above marginal operation costs
4because at the margin, user fee revenue substitutes either for distortionary taxation or sub-
sidies. However, the optimal contract retains the characteristics of the previous case, as it is
described by two thresholds m and M such that in high-demand states the concession runs for
a ﬁnite term; in low-demand states subsidies are paid out and the concession runs indeﬁnitely;
and in intermediate-demand states the concession lasts indeﬁnitely but no subsidies are paid
out.
In a second extension we examine a standard moral hazard model where the concession-
aire’s effort during the investment stage tilts the distribution of demand states towards higher
realizations. Again, the optimal contract is characterized by thresholds m and M, and high-,
intermediate- and low-demand states emerge as before, for exactly the same reasons. However,
minimum revenue guarantees in low-demand states and revenue caps in high-demand states
are state-contingent in order to provide incentives for effort.
There is a growing literature on PPPs related to this paper.9 Risk sharing between the gov-
ernment and the concessionaire has been always a concern among practitioners and policy
makers. The standard prescription is that each risk should be allocated to the party best able to
manage it. Irwin(2007, p. 14) is more precise: eachrisk should be allocatedto maximize project
value, taking account of moral hazard, adverse selection and risk-bearing preferences.10 Marti-
mort and Pouyet (2006) study this problem in a moral hazard model where effort during invest-
ment affects both the quality of the infrastructure and its operating cost. Bentz et al. (2005), on
theotherhand,studyamodelwithmoralhazardinbuildingandadverseselectioninoperation.
Our paper, by contrast, studies the implications of the optimal allocation of demand risk,
when subsidy ﬁnance is less efﬁcient than user-fee ﬁnance. Even though we consider the ex-
tension to the case with moral hazard, our main ﬁndings are best illustrated without this as-
sumption. We show that intertemporal and not period-by-period risk matters in the case of
PPPs. This implies that variable, state-contingent concession lengths are a key component of
the optimal risk-sharing contract. Moreover, the explicit modeling of the intertemporal na-
ture of PPPs shows that there is no fundamental difference between revenue guarantees and
subsidies, since guarantees are analogous to state-contingent subsidies. In addition, we pro-
vide a rigorous foundation for minimum revenue guarantees and revenue caps and show that
the optimal guarantees and caps bear no relation to observed guarantees and revenue sharing
agreements.
The optimal demand risk-sharing contract we derive in this paper also has implications for
9See Grimsey and Lewis (2004) for a survey, history and experience, and Grimsey and Lewis (2005) for a col-
lection of articles on PPPs. Vaillancourt-Rosenau (2000) and Akintoye et al. (2003) include useful collections of
essays.
10See also the discussion in Dewatripont and Legros (2005).
5the ongoing debate about privatizations and PPPs.11 The literature points out that bundling
has several attributes which are typically associated to privatization. Thus in a PPP the conces-
sionaire owns assets (Hart, 2003);12 retains control over how to produce the service and may
unilaterally implement any cost-saving innovation (Bennet and Iossa, 2006); and directly col-
lects user fees (Grout and Stevens, 2003). However, another hallmark of privatization is that
demand risk is transferred to the ﬁrm.13 In this paper we show that if demand risk is allocated
optimally, the allocation of revenue, in present-value terms, is often similar to that under con-
ventional provision of infrastructure. Most, or even all, risk is borne by the government and the
concessionaire recovers the upfront investment in most states. Moreover, in the optimal con-
tract the concessionaire should receive no compensation after the end of the concession, once
the asset is transferred to the government. By contrast, under privatization, assets and cash
ﬂows are transferred forever to a private concessionaire in exchange for a one time payment.
This means that the link between the project and the public budget is permanently severed.
Under a PPP this link continues to exist, even when the compensation to the concessionaire is
derived solely from user fees.
Our results follow from the assumption that a large risk-neutral government, able to spread
risk, contracts with a risk-averse ﬁrm to undertake a “small” project. In the context of PPPs,
some authors ﬁnd this assumption entirely plausible and probably correct (see, for example,
Dewatripont and Legros [2005, pp. 133 and 134] and Hart [2003, p. C75]). Others are skeptical,
and point out that private ﬁrms can use the capital market to diversify risks at least as well as
the government.14 We do not claim to have solved this controversy. But we point out that the
case for PPPs is very weak if private ﬁrms are more efﬁcient and better at diversifying risks,
because in this case privatization dominates PPPs. Moreover, it is a well known fact that private
ﬁrmsroutinelydemandminimumrevenueguaranteesbecausetheydeemdemandriskinPPPs
excessive.15
This paper is also related to the literature on franchise bidding pioneered by Chadwick
(1859)andDemsetz(1968),accordingtowhichcompetitionforamonopolyinfrastructureproject
11See, for example, Daniels and Trebilcock (1996, 2000), Gerrard (2001), Savas (2000), and Starr (1988)
12Though usually it needs authorization to sell assets that are comprised in the concession.
13Eurostat, the Statistical Ofﬁce of the European Communities, focuses on this feature when deciding whether a
PPP-asset should be classiﬁed as governmental or not: “Eurostat recommends that the assets involved in a public-
private partnership should be classiﬁed as non-government assets, and therefore recorded off balance sheet for
government, if both of the following conditions are met: (1) the private partner bears the construction risk, and
(2) the private partner bears at least one of either availability or demand risk.” Eurostat Press Ofﬁce, February 11,
2004.
14See, for example, Hemmings [2006 pp 12 and 13] and Klein (1997). For a discussion of the controversy in
economics see Brealey et al. (1997)
15AsimilarconcernpossiblyunderliestherecentmoveinEuropeawayfromshadowtollcontractstowardsavail-
ability payments.
6will replicate the competitive outcome (see Stigler [1968], Posner [1972], Riordan and Sapping-
ton[1987],Spulber[1989,ch.9],LaffontandTirole[1993,chs.7and8],HarstadandCrew[1999]
and Engel et al. [2001] for papers within this tradition, and Williamson [1976, 1985] for a criti-
cism). Wecontributetothisliteraturebyconsideringcaseswhereprojectsarenotself-ﬁnancing
and government subsidies are necessary to make them feasible. We also show that in that case
the optimal risk-sharing contract can be implemented with a two-threshold auction with real-
istic informational requirements.
Finally, in Engel et al. (2001), we studied the optimal private provision of infrastructure
projects by solving a Ramsey problem with variable concession lengths. In that paper we as-
sumed a “self-ﬁnancing constraint,” which ruled out government transfers to the concession-
aire. In the present paper, demand-contingent government subsidies play a central role, thus
providing a framework to study the public ﬁnance of PPPs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model and the basic irrelevance
result when there is no difference between government and private provisions is presented in
section 2. In section 3 we derive the optimal risk-sharing contract when subsidy spending is
inefﬁcient. Section4showshowtheoptimalcontractcanbeimplementedwithanauction,and
section 5 presents the extensions. Section 6 concludes and is followed by several appendices.
2 Benchmark model and irrelevance result
A risk-neutral benevolent social planner must hire a concessionaire to ﬁnance, build and op-
erate an infrastructure project with exogenous technical characteristics. There are no main-
tenance nor operation costs,16 the up-front investment does not depreciate, and the conces-
sionaire is selected among many ﬁrms that can build the project at cost I > 0.17 All ﬁrms are
identical, risk-averse expected utility maximizers, with preferences represented by the strictly
concave utility function u (see footnote 6).
WeassumethattheprojectissociallyproﬁtableandthataPPPyieldsahighersocialsurplus
than conventional unbundled provision (appendices A and B spell out conditions for this to be
the case).
16This assumption is relaxed in section 5. In any case, there are two reasons why ignoring maintenance and
operations costs is not a serious limitation. First, for many infrastructure projects, upfront costs are much larger
than maintenance and operation costs (consider the examples of highways, dams, sport stadiums and rail lines).
Secondly, if maintenance and operations costs are proportional to demand for the project, which is a good ap-
proximation in the case of highways and rail lines, then the case with maintenance and operations costs is a trivial
extension.
17That is, we ignore construction cost uncertainty and focus instead on demand uncertainty, which is consider-
ably larger for many PPP projects.
7Demand uncertainty is summarized by a probability density over the present value of user
fee revenue that the infrastructure can generate over its entire lifetime, f (v), with c.d.f. F(v).
Thisdensityiscommonknowledgetoﬁrmsandtheplanner,andisboundedfrombelowbyvmin
and from above by vmax. Also, for simplicity we assume that v equals the discounted private
willingness to pay for the project’s services.18
2.1 Planner’s problem
Let PS(v) denote producer surplus in state v, CS(v) denote consumer surplus in state v and α∈
[0,1] be the weight that the planner gives to producer surplus in the social welfare function.19
The planner’s objective is to maximize20,21
Z
[CS(v)+αPS(v)] f (v)dv, (1)
subject to the concessionaire’s participation constraint
Z
u(PS(v))f (v)dv ≥u(0),
where u(0) is the concessionaire’s outside option.22
To maximize (1), the planner chooses how much user fee revenue and subsidy the conces-
sionaire should receive in each state v. Denote by R(v) the present value of user fee revenue
collected by the concessionaire in state v, and by S(v) the present value of the subsidy it re-
ceives. Hence
PS(v)=R(v)+S(v)−I (2)
Note that by “subsidy” we mean any cash transfer from the government to the private con-
cessionaire. It may be the up-front payment made by the government with conventional un-
18In Appendix A we show that this and other simpliﬁcations do not affect the structure of the optimal PPP con-
tract.
19Observe that in many countries foreign ﬁrms are important investors in PPPs, which implies α<1.
20This objective function assumes that the income of users is uncorrelated with the beneﬁt of using the project,
so that if users spend a small fraction of their incomes on the services of the project they will value the beneﬁts
produced by the project as if they were risk neutral. See Arrow and Lind (1970).
21The planner cares about ﬁrms’ proﬁts not per se but because these constitute a source of income for ﬁrms’
owners. This, combined with the assumption that the planner can redistribute income among consumers at no
social cost and that each project is relatively small compared to the size of the economy, explains why producer
surplus, and not the expected utility of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, enters the planner’s objective function.
22Byusingthesameprobabilitydensityintheplanner’sobjectivefunctionandtheconcessionaire’sparticipation
constraint, we are ignoring possible differences between the planner’s and the concessionaire’s risk-free discount
rates.
8bundled provision (in which case S(v) is the same for all v), but it could also be a cash trans-
fer made over time, contingent on v, to supplement revenue from the project under a Build-
Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) contract (a so-called ‘minimum revenue guarantee’).
Since the concessionaire receives R(v) in state v, the government receives v −R(v) and we
have 0≤R(v)≤ v. If the term of the concession is ﬁnite and v−R(v)>0, these funds are used to
reduce distortionary taxation elsewhere in the economy. Moreover, assuming that willingness
to pay is positive at all points in time, we have that R(v) = v only when the concession lasts
forever.
Let E be an externality generated by the project and λ>1 the cost of public funds. Then
CS(v)=[v −R(v)−λS(v)]+E +(λ−1)[v −R(v)] (3a)
=λ[v −R(v)−S(v)]+E. (3b)
The ﬁrst term in the r.h.s. of (3a), v −R(v)−λS(v), is the difference between users’ willingness
to pay in state v and the total amount transferred to the concessionaire, where the cost of the
subsidyisincreasedbythetaxdistortionrequiredtoﬁnanceit. Thetermv−R(v)istotalrevenue
collected by the government (after the end of the concession), so the second term in the r.h.s.
of (3a) corresponds to the reduction in distortionary taxes due to this increased revenue.
Substituting (2) and (3b) in (1) shows that maximizing the planner’s objective function (1) is
equivalent to maximizing
−(λ−α)
Z
[R(v)+S(v)]f (v)dv.
and therefore to minimizing Z
[R(v)+S(v)]f (v)dv. (4)
Where we have dropped E, αI and λv from the objective function because they do not depend
ontheplanner’schoicevariables,R andS,andwherewehaveusedthatλ>1≥α. Theplanner’s
9program can be rewritten as23
min
{R(v),S(v)}
Z
[R(v)+S(v)]f (v)dv. (5a)
s.t.
Z
u(R(v)+S(v)−I)f (v)dv ≥u(0), (5b)
0≤R(v)≤ v, (5c)
S(v)≥0, (5d)
2.2 Irrelevance result
It has been claimed that a PPP is desirable because it relieves the public budget by substituting
private ﬁnance for distortionary tax ﬁnance.24 Does this argument make the case for PPPs?
It follows from the objective function (4) that the per-dollar cost of paying the concession-
aire with user fee revenues or subsidies is the same. Thus, social welfare only depends on total
transfers T (v) = R(v)+S(v) to the concessionaire, not on the partition between subsidies and
user fee revenue. This is the fundamental insight behind the following result:
Proposition 1 (Irrelevance of the cost-of-funds argument) Anycombinationofuserfeeandsub-
sidy schedules that satisﬁes constraints (5c) and (5d) and such that T (v) = I for all v solves the
planner’s program (5a)–(5d).
Proof See Appendix C.1.
Whatistheeconomicsofthisresult? ThestandardreasoninginfavorofPPPspointsoutthat
subsidiesareanexpensivesourceofﬁnance,becausetheyareﬁnancedwithdistortionarytaxes.
Yet the multiplicity of optimal subsidy-sales revenue combinations indicates that distortionary
taxation(λ>1)isnotsufﬁcienttopreferprivateprovision. OnesolutionisR(v)≡0andS(v)≡ I.
Another solution is that the concessionaire invests I, collects user-fee revenues equal to I in
present value, and no subsidies are paid.25 In addition, there is a continuum of combinations
where the government provides a partial subsidy.
23In Appendix A we consider several additional variables mentioned in the literature that may inﬂuence the
choice in favor or against a PPP . In all cases these additional variables are independent of the planner’s choice
functions, R and S. Consequently, if the planner goes for a PPP , her objective function remains similar to (4). In
Appendix A we also show that it is straightforward to model exogenous restrictions on term length, an imperfect
ability to appropriate consumer surplus using user fees, and so on. In all cases the additional constraints or vari-
ables affect the particular solution to program (5a)–(5d), but not its structure.
24An even bolder claim is that I in public funds are permanently liberated with a PPP . But setting up the prob-
lem in present value terms immediately exposes this fallacy—the concessionaire must recover its investment by
receiving future payments.
25This is only possible if vmin ≥ I, for otherwise the project cannot be ﬁnanced with user fees in all states.
10The intuition for this result is that if the user fee revenue collected by the concessionaire
increases by $1, the government has to levy $1 in additional taxes to replace this transfer, which
costs society λ. This is the same cost that society bears when paying $1 in additional subsidies.
Hence, at the margin the opportunity cost of user fee revenue or subsidizing the concessionaire
is exactly the same. The rich set of optimal combinations of state-contingent subsidies and
concession terms reﬂects that user fees and subsidies are perfect substitutes in the planner’s
objective function.
A similar argument shows that the planner will satisfy the concessionaire’s participation
constraint with equality. An additional dollar in the concessionaires pocket increases social
welfare in α, but costs λ to users. Since λ > α, the planner chooses not to provide rents to the
concessionaire. Finally, note that the optimal contract provides full insurance to the conces-
sionaire.
Application: Evaluating shadow fees and availability payments
In several industrialized countries PPPs are fully ﬁnanced with subsidies. However, instead
of paying for the infrastructure up-front, the concessionaire is compensated with so-called
“shadowfees,”thatis,per-userfeespaiddirectlybythegovernmentforaﬁxedperiodofT years.
For example, Britain highway concessionaires are paid a shadow toll for each car on the high-
way. Proposition 1 suggests that these contracts are suboptimal because the concessionaire is
forced to bear risk.
If, on the other hand, the concessionaire is paid a so-called availability payment—a yearly
sumindependentoftherealizationofdemand,butconditionalondeliveringtheagreedservice
quality —, the concessionaire bears no risk, and the contract is optimal if the concessionaire
receives no rents.26 Thus, Proposition 1 provides an argument against ﬁxed term contracts with
shadow fees, and in favor of availability contracts.27
Corollary 1 When no user fees can be charged (usually due to political constraints), S(v) = I for
all states v characterizes the unique optimal contract. Hence shadow fees which make payments
contingent on the use of the infrastructure for a ﬁxed and ﬁnite term T are not optimal. By con-
trast, availability contracts that leave no rents for the ﬁrm are optimal.
26This result extends to the case where yearly payments by the government also include operational costs in-
curred by the ﬁrm to satisfy demand. What is central for the result to hold is the absence of a link between demand
realizations and the recovery of the upfront investment.
27Shadow fees may be more attractive when the ﬁrm can exert costly effort to inﬂuence demand. See Section 5.2
113 Optimal contract with inefﬁcient subsidies
The irrelevance result implies that the case for PPPs cannot rest on the claim that they relieve
strained budgets. When are PPPs warranted? As mentioned in the introduction, one justiﬁca-
tion of PPPs is that bundling may enhance productive efﬁciency (see section 3.6). An additional
advantage of PPPs is that they reduce the sums ﬂowing through the public budget, reducing the
inefﬁciencies associated with subsidy transfers. In this section we derive the optimal contract
when subsidy ﬁnancing is less efﬁcient than user-fee ﬁnancing.
3.1 Modeling the inefﬁciency of subsidy ﬁnancing
To model inefﬁciency subsidy ﬁnancing, we assume that achieving $1 of useful spending costs
$1 if ﬁnanced by the private sector but ζ > 1 dollars if ﬁnanced with a subsidy. If subsidies
are monetary transfers from the government to the concessionaire, then ζ > 1 means that not
all the resources reach their intended end. Other interpretations are possible. For example, if
the government provides subsidies in kind by building part of the infrastructure, the ζ parame-
ter captures the government’s productive inefﬁciency relative to private ﬁrms: the government
must spend ζ dollars for each $1 spent by the private ﬁrm.28
Formally, introducing ζ implies that the term λS(v) in (3a) must be replaced by λζS(v)—
the inefﬁcient subsidy transfer increases the magnitude of the tax distortion. The planner’s
program now is
min
{R(v),S(v)}
Z
[(λ−α)R(v)+(λζ−α)S(v)]f (v)dv. (6a)
s.t.
Z
u(R(v)+S(v)−I)f (v)dv ≥u(0), (6b)
0≤R(v)≤ v, (6c)
S(v)≥0. (6d)
It is apparent from (6a) that if ζ > 1, user fees are a more efﬁcient compensation the con-
cessionaire. The cost to society of one dollar in user fees is λ−α, while a subsidy costs λζ−α.
Of course, ζ>1 is not a sufﬁcient argument against subsidizing projects, for the project’s social
value may exceed I, and user fee revenue may be insufﬁcient to compensate the concession-
aireinlow-demandstates. But, aswewillseenext, ζ>1determinesthestructureoftheoptimal
risk-sharing contract.
28For example, public sector unions may demand higher wages, public agencies may be overstaffed, and rigid
budgetary rules may hinder procedures and increase costs.
123.2 Optimal risk-sharing contract: overview
The tradeoff faced by the planner when ζ > 1 is the following: On the one hand, it would like
to utilize user fee revenues as far as possible to compensate the concessionaire, in order to
avoid paying subsidies. On the other hand, using only user fees may expose the concessionaire
to excessive risk, and an efﬁcient contract would insure against low demand states through
subsidies.
Figure 1: Optimal contract, intermediate demand project  
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Figure 1 shows how the trade off is resolved optimally when vmin < I < vmax (i.e., there are
some states of demand in which user fee revenues is smaller than I while there are others in
which revenues are larger than I). The horizontal axis plots the support of v while the vertical
axis shows the total revenue received by the concessionaire in each state, R(v)+S(v).
We will show that the optimal contract is characterized by two thresholds, a minimum rev-
enue guarantee m and a revenue cap M. These thresholds, in turn, deﬁne three types of de-
mand states. In low-demand states v < m, R(v) = v and S(v) = m −v. Hence the concession
lasts forever and the concessionaire receives a subsidy to attain the guaranteed minimum rev-
enue m. By contrast, in high-demand states v > M and R(v)= M. Thus the concession ends in
ﬁnitetimeandthegovernmentgets v−M. Theremainingcases,whichwedenoteintermediate-
demand states, are such that m ≤ v ≤ M, R(v) = v and S(v) = 0. In these states the concession
13lastsindeﬁnitely, butnosubsidiesarepaid. Theremainderofthissectionderivestheoptimality
of this risk-sharing arrangement.
3.3 A taxonomy of demand states
To derive the optimal contract, note that in state v the planner will only resort to subsidies after
exhausting user fees—otherwise, it could slightly reduce subsidy payments, which would save
ζλ−α; and increase R(v), which would cost only λ−α. Thus:
S(v)>0=⇒R(v)= v,
or equivalently
R(v)< v =⇒S(v)=0.
Now let µ > 0 denote the multiplier of the concessionaire’s participation constraint (6b).29
The FOC with respect to R(v) for a state v such that the term of the concession is ﬁnite leads to
u0(R(v)−I)=
λ−α
µ
. (7)
While the FOC with respect to S(v) for a state where subsidies are paid leads to
u0(v +S(v)−I)=
λζ−α
µ
, (8)
where in both cases we have used that revenue ﬁnancing dominates subsidy ﬁnancing. Deﬁne
m and M via
u0(m−I)=
λζ−α
µ
, (9)
u0(M −I)=
λ−α
µ
, (10)
and let ¯ ζ≡(λζ−α)/(λ−α).30 Since ζ>1 we have m < M and
u0(m−I)= ¯ ζu0(M −I),
It follows from (7) and (10) that in states with v > M no subsidies are paid out and the con-
cessionlastsuntiltheconcessionairecollects M inpresentvalue. Thegovernment,ontheother
29Note that the participation constraint will hold with equality because λ>α, hence µ>0.
30Note that ¯ ζ>1⇐⇒ζ>1 and ¯ ζ<1⇐⇒ζ<1. Furthermore, ζ= ¯ ζ when α=0.
14hand, collects v −M after the concession ends. Thus, in high-demand states the concession-
aire’s revenue is capped by M and the term of the concession is variable.31
Similarly, from (8) and (9) we have that a subsidy equal to m −v is paid in states with v <
m. Therefore, in low-demand states the concession lasts indeﬁnitely and the concessionaire
receives a minimum revenue guarantee.
Finally, there is a third class of states of demand such that m ≤ v ≤ M. In these states the
concessionlastsindeﬁnitely, forotherwisetheywouldbehigh-demandstates. Butnosubsidies
are paid out by the government, for otherwise they would be low-demand states. It follows that
R(v)= v and S(v)=0 in this class.
We summarize this characterization in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (A taxonomy of demand states) The optimal contract is characterized by a min-
imum revenue guarantee, m, and revenue cap, M, with m < M, as follows:
1. If M < v,theconcessionairecollects M inpresentdiscounteduserfeeswhilethegovernment
collects the remaining v −M. No subsidies are paid and the concession term is ﬁnite. These
are high-demand states.
2. If m ≤ v ≤ M, the concession lasts indeﬁnitely and no subsidies are paid. Total revenues
accrued to the concessionaire in present value equals v and the government budget is un-
affected by the concession. These are intermediate-demand states.
3. If v < m, the concession lasts indeﬁnitely and the government grants a subsidy of m−v to
the concessionaire. These are low-demand states.
Let us comment on the economics of this taxonomy. In any state with a ﬁnite concession
term, the social opportunity cost of the last dollar received by the concessionaire is λ−α; this
justiﬁes equalizing the concessionaire’s revenue across high-demand states by ﬁxing a revenue
cap M. On the other hand, in any low-demand state the last dollar paid to the concessionaire
comes from a subsidy and costs society λζ−α. Again, this justiﬁes equalizing revenue across
low-demand states at the minimum revenue guarantee m < M.
AscanbeseenfromFigure1,thedifferencebetweenλ−αandλζ−αintroducesawedgeM−
m that leads to the emergence of intermediate-demand states. To see the intuition, consider
31If demand grows at a the same rate in all demand states, this implies that higher values of v correspond to
shorter concession terms. This is not necessarily true with more general demand schedules.
15one such state, e v. It is straightforward to obtain the following inequalities
1
¯ ζ
<
u0(e v −I)
u0(m−I)
<1<
u0(e v −I)
u0(M −I)
< ¯ ζ.
These inequalities imply that the concessionaire’s marginal utility evaluated at e v −I is smaller
than the marginal utility at m, but higher than the marginal utility at M. In other words, the
shadow value of the last dollar received by the concessionaire in state e v is too low to warrant a
subsidy,aswellastoohightowarrantarevenuecap. Consequently,theconcessionlastsforever,
but no subsidies are paid.
3.4 A taxonomy of projects
To complete the characterization of the optimal contract, we show how m and M are deter-
mined, which leads to a taxonomy of projects.
Consider ﬁrst the case where user fees can ﬁnance the project in all demand states, that is,
vmin ≥ I. The optimal contract sets R(v) = M = I ≤ v for all v, and the concessionaire receives
full insurance—all states are high demand states when vmin ≥ I.32 To see that this contract
is optimal, note ﬁrst that it is clearly feasible. Moreover, no contract can give less than I on
average to the concessionaire, for then the participation constraint would not hold; and had
the concessionaire been forced to bear risk, he would have required more than I on average.
Consider next the case where user fees are never large enough pay for the project, that is,
vmax < I. Then m = I. For if m > I, all states are low-demand, and the concessionaire’s partici-
pation constraint holds with slack, which cannot be optimal. And if m < I, the concessionaire’s
participation constraint cannot be satisﬁed, because revenue in all demand states will be be-
low I. It follows that m = I while now M is irrelevant. Thus, the optimal contract subsidizes
the concessionaire in all demand states to ensure that total revenue is equal to the cost of the
project.
We refer to a project with vmin ≥ I as a high-demand project, while one with vmax < I is a
low-demand project, and summarize these results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 (Optimal contract for high- and low-demand projects) Theoptimalcontractfor
high- and low-demand projects speciﬁes that R(v)+S(v)= I for all v. Given demand realization
v, the government collects v−I in each state if the project is high-demand, while it pays a subsidy
of I −v in each state if the project is low-demand.
32The formal proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. Also note that from m < M it follows that no subsidies are
paid out for all feasible values of m, and therefore this threshold is irrelevant to pin down the optimal contract.
16The economics of Proposition 3 should be apparent. The social cost of transferring an ad-
ditional dollar to the concessionaire is λ−α in all states when a project is high demand, and
full insurance immediately follows. In a low-demand project the social cost of transferring an
additional dollar to the concessionaire is higher (i.e., λζ−α), but is also the same across states
and therefore full insurance is optimal.
As we can see from Figure 1, the structure of the optimal contract is different for projects
such that vmin < I ≤ vmax, for a contract that gives full insurance to the concessionaire (m =
M = I) is no longer optimal. To see this, consider decreasing m to I −∆m, and using the funds
to increase M to I +∆M. Lowering the minimum revenue guarantee frees up resources F(I)∆m
in expected value, and this can be used to ﬁnance an increase in M of F(I)∆m/(1−F(I)).33 So-
ciety is made better off in the process, since each dollar saved in guarantees is ¯ ζ>1 times more
valuable than a dollar of foregone user fee revenue. Thus it follows from (6a) that the planner’s
objective function improves by λ(ζ−1)F(I)∆m. Increased risk reduces the concessionaire’s ex-
pected utility by an expression on the order of (∆m)2. It follows that the optimal values of m
and M satisfy m < I < M.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal values of both thresholds.
Proposition 4 (Optimal contract for intermediate-demand projects) Consider a project such
that vmin ≤ I < vmax (intermediate-demand project). Assume u0(vmin−I)> ¯ ζu0(vmax−I).34 Then
theoptimalcontractischaracterizedbyquantitiesm and M,with vmin <m < I < M < vmax,such
that states with v > M are high-demand, states with m ≤ v ≤ M are intermediate-demand and
states with v < m are low-demand.35 Also, m and M are determined from the concessionaire’s
participation constraint
F(m)u(m−I)+
Z M
m
u(v −I)f (v)dv +(1−F(M))u(M −I)=u(0). (11)
33Since this is an intermediate demand project, 0<F(I)<1.
34This condition ensures that m > vmin and M < vmax, so that condition (12) below holds with equality. Two
possibilities arise if u0(vmin −I) < ¯ ζu0(vmax−I). First, if
R
u(v −I)f (v)dv > u(0), the optimal contract involves no
subsidies (m < vmin) and M is determined from
Z M
vmin
u(v −I)f (v)dv +(1−F(M))u(M −I)=u(0).
By contrast, the optimal contract involves no revenue cap when
R
u(v−I)f (v)dv <u(0). In this case the minimum
income guarantee is determined by
F(m)u(m−I)+
Z vmax
m
u(v −I)f (v)dv =u(0).
35See Proposition 2 for the deﬁnition of high, intermediate and low demand states.
17and the condition
u0(m−I)= ¯ ζu0(M −I). (12)
Proof See Appendix C.2.
3.5 Comparative statics
Comparative statics for high- and low-demand projects are straightforward. When I rises, the
planner must transfer more revenue to the concessionaire. On the other hand, changes in ¯ ζ or
in the concessionaire’s degree of risk aversion have no effect on the optimal contract.
By contrast, in an intermediate-demand project both an increase in ¯ ζ or a fall in the conces-
sionaire’sdegreeofriskaversionincreasesthewedgebetweentheminimumrevenueguarantee
m and the revenue cap M. Moreover, the risk premium demanded by a concessionaire with de-
creasing absolute risk aversion grows with I, but does not change if absolute risk aversion is
constant. The following proposition formalizes these results:
Proposition 5 (Comparative statics) Denote by m(ζ,I) the minimum revenue guarantee, and
by M(ζ,I) the revenue cap that characterize the optimal contract, both as a function of the in-
efﬁciency parameter ζ and the upfront investment I. Assume (ζ,I) is such that vmin < m(ζ,I) <
M(ζ,I)< vmax and denote CARA(c)≡−u00(c)/u0(c). Then:
(i) The risk borne by the concessionaire, as measured by the wedge M −m, increases with the
social cost of subsidies, ζ. Furthermore,
λ
(λζ−α)CARA(m−I)
≤
∂M
∂ζ
(ζ,I) −
∂m
∂ζ
(ζ,I) ≤
λ
(λζ−α)CARA(M −I)
.
(ii) The thresholds m and M are increasing in I and grow faster than I. Moreover, for a conces-
sionairewithdecreasingabsoluteriskaversion,thewedgebetween M andm increaseswith
I, while it does not depend on I if the concessionaire has constant absolute risk aversion.
Proof See Appendix C.3.
3.6 Applications
Minimum income guarantees and revenue sharing Minimum income guarantees are rou-
tine in many types of PPPs. However, most real world contracts have a ﬁxed term and therefore
do not follow the prescriptions laid out in Proposition 4. These contracts would be closer to the
18optimal contract if their durations were longer in low-demand states, when guarantees are paid
out. Thus, real world contracts pay too much guarantees in low demand states.
Real world proﬁt and revenue sharing agreements also do not coincide with the revenue
cap that characterizes the optimal contract. When governments impose proﬁt sharing arrange-
ments, they split revenues in excess of a given threshold with the concessionaire in ﬁxed pro-
portions. By contrast, Propositions 3 and 4 suggest assigning all the revenue in excess of a given
threshold to the government—the windfall proﬁts tax rate should be 100%.
More generally, the rationale behind real-world guarantees and revenue sharing schemes
is to reduce the risk borne by the concessionaire. By contrast, the rationale behind the opti-
mal contract in Propositions 3 and 4 is to optimally trade off insurance on one hand, and the
use of user fees and subsidies on the other. This is why the concession lasts indeﬁnitely when
subsidies(i.e.,guarantees)aregranted; thetermisvariableinhigh-demandstates; andthecon-
cessionaire’s revenue in high-demand states is higher than in low-demand states.
When is a PPP warranted? Bundling, incentives and the optimal contract The structure of
the optimal risk-sharing contract is largely determined by the desire to minimize subsidy ﬁ-
nance. Bundling allows the planner to take cash ﬂows off the public budget by substituting user
fees for subsidies, thus increasing productive efﬁciency. Yet this is not always enough to make
thecaseforaPPP .WhetheraPPPisbetterthanconventionalunbundledprovisionalsodepends
crucially on how bundling affects incentives.
The central observation was made by Hart (2003), who showed that bundling links invest-
ment spending with life-cycle operation costs. Hence, bundling stimulates non-contractible
investments that cut operation costs. But cost cutting is not necessarily desirable, because it
may come at the expense of lower service quality. Therefore, in his model, a PPP may be bet-
ter if cost cutting is socially beneﬁcial, but conventional provision probably carries the day if
service quality cannot be well speciﬁed and cost cutting substantially deteriorates it.36
In different guises, this insight emerges in most comparisons of PPPs with conventional
provision. Bennet and Iossa (2006) observe that PPPs also transfer ownership of the asset to
the concessionaire and, in many cases, substitute output and performance measures for input
speciﬁcations. WithaPPP ,then,theconcessionaireretainssomeorallcontrolrightsoverhowto
produce the service, and may unilaterally implement any cost-saving innovation. By contrast,
with conventional provision the government retains the right to tell the concessionaire how to
produce, and cost-reducing innovations can be implemented only after bilateral bargaining.37
36See also Grout (1997).
37Typically, conventional unbundled provision assumes government ownership, while with a PPP the conces-
sionaire owns the asset and has control rights over how to produce the service. Of course, ownership usually is
19Because of this, the case for a PPP again rests on the effect of cost-reducing innovations. If the
main impact is to cut costs, with little or no effect on service quality and value, then a PPP is
probably better. By contrast, if the main effect of innovations is to increase social surplus and
perhaps to increase operation costs, conventional unbundled provision is better because only
the government may care about social welfare.
Martimort and Pouyet (2006), in turn, analyze a moral hazard model where non-veriﬁable
effort during construction increases quality and gross social surplus, but may either reduce or
increase costs during operation. In line with incomplete contracting models, they show that a
PPP beats conventional provision if and only if quality enhancements reduce operation costs.
So does the intertemporal incentive effects of bundling affect the structure of the optimal
risk-sharing contract derived above? The answer is no. As we show in Appendix B, the costs and
beneﬁts affected by bundling are not functions of R or S. For this reason, and as far as the plan-
ner’s program is concerned, these variables are just like terms E or αI in the planner’s problem.
A neat separation thus emerges. On the one hand, incentives change when investment and life
cycle costs are linked, and this affects whether a PPP is better than conventional provision. On
the other hand, it does not affect the structure of the optimal risk-sharing contract conditional
on choosing a PPP .
4 Implementation
Theinformationalrequirementsneededtoimplementtheoptimalcontractmightseemformidable,
but somewhat surprisingly, this is not the case. We show next how to implement the optimal
contract with a competitive auction when the planner knows neither I nor ﬁrms’ risk aversion.
4.1 High- and low-demand projects
Consider ﬁrst a high-demand project. Then an auction where the bidding variable is the total
present value of user fee revenues (PVR) collected by the concessionaire, β, implements the
optimalcontract. Thisfollowsfromnotingthatrentswillbedissipatedinacompetitiveauction,
so that β will satisfy: Z
u(β−I)f (v)dv =u(0). (13)
limited, for example, authorization may be needed to sell assets or transfer the concession. Bennet and Iossa
(2006) also study two rather unconventional structures: bundling with government ownership and unbundled
provision with private ownership of assets and control rights over how to produce the service. We ignore such
structures here.
20Hence the winning bid will be β = I, which corresponds to the optimal contract derived in
the preceding section. Denote by T(v) the time it takes for user fee revenue accumulated in
state v to attain I. The concession term is shorter when demand is high, that is, when T(v) is
small.38 The concessionaire bears no risk because users pay him the same amount in all states
of nature.39 Furthermore, the planner can implement the optimal contract using a PVR auction
even if she does not know I, the density f (v) or the concessionaire’s degree of risk aversion. All
the planner needs to know is that the project can ﬁnance itself in all states of demand, that is,
that vmin ≥ I.40
Consider next a low-demand project. A PVR auction will implement the optimal contract in
this case as well, as long as the government subsidizes the difference between the winning bid
and the present value of user fees collected. In this case ﬁrms end up bidding on a minimum
incomeguaranteeandthewinningbidensuresatotalrevenueof I. Informationalrequirements
are modest again, since the planner only needs to know that vmax < I, and be able to verify
revenue in each state. Note that the concession lasts forever in this case. We summarize both
cases reviewed so far as follows:
Proposition 6 (High- and low-demand projects) Theoptimalcontractcanbeimplementedwith
a PVR auction, or a simple extensions thereof, for both high- and low-demand projects. Further-
more, bidders reveal I in the auction and there is no need to know f or u.
Application: Evaluatingleastsubsidyauctions Low-demandprojectsaresometimesawarded
to the ﬁrm that makes a bid for the smallest subsidy. That is, the government sets a ﬁxed con-
cession term T and a user fee p, and ﬁrms bid the subsidy they require to build, operate and
maintain the project.
Assume that cumulative user fee revenue accrued by time t in state v is equal to γ(t,v)v,
with γ strictly increasing in t, and limt→∞γ(t,v) = 1. Assuming a competitive auction, so that
ex-ante rents are dissipated, the winning bid S then satisﬁes:
Z
u
¡
γ(T,v)v +S−I
¢
f (v)dv =u(0),
which means that the concessionaire will be forced to bear risk.41 It follows that
S > I −
Z
γ(T,v)v f (v)dv.
38As noted in footnote 31, this requires that demand grows at the same rate in all states.
39Uncertaintyin I,whichmaybeimportantinsomeprojects,cannotbeeliminatedwithavariabletermcontract.
40This case is considered in Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2001).
41Note that limt→∞γ(t,v)=1 and vmin < vmax imply that γ(T,v)v has to vary with v.
21and, since γ(T,v)≤1,
S > I −µv,
where µv is the mean of f (v).
By contrast, with a PVR auction the equilibrium outcome satisﬁes S(v)= I −v and expected
expenditures are equal to:
E[S]= I −µv.
With a minimum subsidy auction the subsidy is the same in all states of demand, which
forcestheconcessionairetobearrisk. Bycontrast,theoptimalcontractfeaturesstate-contingent
subsidies that ensure that the concessionaire bears no risk. This leads to the somewhat coun-
terintuitive result that the average subsidy paid out with a PVR auction is lower than the win-
ning bid in a lowest-subsidy auction. The concessionaire is forced to bear risk in the latter case,
therefore demanding higher revenue on average, and a higher subsidy.
Proposition 7 (Sub-optimality of least subsidy auctions) Aleast-subsidyauctionofaﬁxed-term
concession is not optimal. Furthermore, for low-demand projects this auction does not minimize
the average subsidy paid out by the government.
4.2 The general case
Next we consider the case where the planner does not know if the project is high, intermediate
or low demand. We also assume that the planner does not know ﬁrms’ risk aversion, but does
know the probability density f (v).42 We show nexthow toimplementtheoptimal contractwith
a simple scoring auction.
Proposition 8 (Optimality of the two-threshold auction) The following two-threshold, scoring
auction implements the optimal contract:
• The government announces the probability density of expected discounted user fee revenue
ﬂow from the project, f (v), and the parameter ¯ ζ that summarizes the wedge between the
shadow cost of public funds and subsidies.
• Firms bid on the minimum revenue guarantee, m, and the cap on their user fee revenue,
M.
42The government should be as informed about demand as third parties, because it either provides the service
directlyoritmustcomparethePPPwithunbundledprovision. Furthermore,substantialpublicplanningisneeded
to design most PPP projects, and this requires an assessment of demand.
22• The ﬁrm that bids the lowest value of the scoring function
W(M,m)= M(1−F(M))+
Z M
0
v f (v)dv + ¯ ζ
Z m
0
(m−v)f (v)dv (14)
wins the concession.
Proof Since all ﬁrms are identical, the winning bid of the competitive auction minimize the
scoring function subject to ﬁrms’ participation constraints. And since the scoring function is
equal to the planner’s objective function, where we use the fact that the optimal contract is
characterized by thresholds m and M, it follows that the winning bid maximizes the planner’s
objective function subject to the ﬁrm’s participation constraint, thereby solving the planner’s
problem.
What is the intuition underlying this result? Note ﬁrst that the planner’s objective func-
tion does not require knowledge of I. The objective function only depends on the probability
distribution of the present value of revenue that the project can generate and the distortions
associated with government expenditures, as summarized by ¯ ζ. By awarding the PPP to the
bidder that maximizes his objective function, and assuming competitive bidding, the planner
induces the concessionaire to solve society’s problem without knowing the cost of the project
or the ﬁrms’ degree of risk aversion.
In the case of a high demand project, the two-threshold auction is equivalent to a PVR auc-
tion. If all states have high demand, any bid with M = I and m ≤ I will win the auction. No
subsidies are paid out and the concession term is shorter if demand is higher. Similarly, in the
case of a low demand project, a bid with m = I and M ≥ I wins the concession, since this time
the upper threshold is irrelevant. In this case the two-threshold auction reduces to the exten-
sion of the PVR auction described above. However, the two-threshold auction is more general
than a PVR auction, as it can be used for intermediate demand projects or, more importantly,
forprojectswheretheplannerdoesnotknowwhethertheprojectislow-,intermediate-orhigh-
demand.
5 Extensions
This section extends our results in two directions. First, we consider a general case where de-
mand responds to pricechangesand the concessionaire faces astandard convex short-runcost
curve. Second, we incorporate moral hazard, by assuming that demand responds to the con-
cessionaire’s unobservable effort.
235.1 Price-responsive demand
Assuming a totally inelastic demand simpliﬁes the derivations, but is not realistic. We show
next that the main insights obtained above carry through to the case with a price-responsive
demand. Once tolls are set appropriately, the optimal contract continues to be characterized
by a minimum guarantee and a cap on revenues.
The planner’s problem
There exists a continuum of veriﬁable demand states indexed by θ and described by a prob-
ability density g(θ). For tractability, we assume that the demand curve becomes known imme-
diately after the project is built and remains constant over time.43
In the earlier sections we had a one-to-one correspondence between demand states, θ, and
the present-value of user fee revenue, v. Now the present value of user fee revenue in a given
demand state depends on the user fee being charged. If user fee p is charged both during and
after the concession, we denote present discounted demand for the infrastructure in state θ by
Q(p,θ), while the present discounted cost of producing Q units is c(Q,θ), which is increasing
and convex inQ.44 It follows that the concessionaire’s discounted cash ﬂow is:
Π(p,θ)≡ pQ(p,θ)−c(Q,θ),
which we assume increasing in θ.
Assumethattheplannergivesweightη≥0totheﬁrm’sdiscountedcashﬂow,andletCS(p,θ)
denote discounted consumer surplus if the user fee is p in state θ. Then
H(p,η,θ)≡CS(p,θ)+ηΠ(p,θ), (15)
is the planner’s discounted welfare.45
Let p∗(η,θ) ≡ argmaxp H(p,η,θ). We assume that p∗(η,θ) increases with η for a ﬁxed value
of θ. That is, the user fee that maximizes (15) increases with the relative importance of pro-
43The results that follow extend easily to the case where the demand schedule grows at an exogenous rate that
may vary over time and with θ, since the price-elasticities of demand do not vary over time in this case as well. The
problem becomes considerably harder when demand is allowed to evolve arbitrarily over time.
44This formulation makes it easy to extend the model to include congestion, which is important in the case of
projects such as roads, tunnels and bridges. See, e.g., Engel et al. (2001).
45For notational simplicity, we use η as a placeholder for α or other valuations of proﬁts.
24ducer’s surplus.46 From the ﬁrst order condition that characterizes p∗(η,θ) we have:
η=−
CSp(p∗(η,θ),θ)
Πp(p∗(η,θ),θ)
, (16)
where CSp and Πp denote the partial derivatives of CS and Π with respect to p. As η grows,
p∗(η,θ) approaches the monopoly price for state θ, denoted by pM(θ). We also assume that
Π(p,θ) is concave and strictly increasing in p in the range [p∗(1,θ),pM(θ)].
For every demand state θ, the planner chooses two prices, the user fee paid during the con-
cession, pC(θ), and the user fee collected by the government after the concession ends, pG(θ).
The planner also sets the optimal concession length T(θ). Let r be the discount rate. For nota-
tional convenience we work with a monotonic transformation of T(θ), L(θ) ≡ e−rT(θ), so that L
decreases as T grows, from a value of 1 when T = 0 to a value of zero when T = ∞. Therefore
the planner chooses functions pC(θ), pG(θ), L(θ) and S(θ), that solve the following program:
max
Z ©
[1−L(θ)]H(pC(θ),α,θ)+L(θ)H(pG(θ),λ,θ)−(λζ−α)S(θ)
ª
g(θ)dθ (17a)
s.t.
Z
u
¡
[1−L(θ)]Π(pC(θ),θ)+S(θ)−I
¢
g(θ)dθ =u(0), (17b)
0≤L(θ)≤1, (17c)
S(θ)≥0. (17d)
Theﬁrsttermintheintegrandof(17a)istheplanner’swelfareduringtheconcession—theplan-
ner weighs the cash ﬂow generated during this period by α, because it accrues to the conces-
sionaire. By contrast, the second term reﬂects welfare after the concession ends—during this
period user fees are collected by the government and substitute for distortionary taxation, thus
explaining why the planner’s weight on instantaneous cash ﬂow is λ. The third term in the ob-
jective function subtracts the cost of subsidies, which reﬂect the difference between the social
cost of one dollar of subsidy, λζ, and the weight the planner gives to an additional dollar in
the concessionaire’s pocket, α. As before, the terms αI and E are omitted because they do not
depend on the planner’s choice variables.
The optimal contract
Whilethedeterminationofoptimaluserfeesisnolongertrivial, thestructureoftheoptimal
contract remains identical to the case of perfectly inelastic demand. Thus, the present value of
46See Engel et al. (2001) for an example with congestion where this property is derived from ﬁrst principles. Of
course, demand must be relatively inelastic.
25thecashﬂowreceivedbytheconcessionaireisequalto M acrossallhigh-demandstates, andm
across low-demand states, with m < M. As before, the cash ﬂow received by the concessionaire
inintermediate-demandstatesliesbetweenm and M. Moreover, high-, intermediate-andlow-
demand projects are deﬁned as before. The following proposition characterizes the optimal
risk-sharing contract which solves program (17a)-(17d).
Proposition 9 (Taxonomy of projects) Projects can be classiﬁed into three types:
(i) A project is high-demand if and only if Π(p∗(λ,θ),θ) ≥ I for all states θ. The concessionaire
receives cash ﬂow I in all states of demand, the concession term is ﬁnite, and the govern-
ment collects Π(p∗(λ,θ),θ)−I. Moreover, pC = pG = p∗(λ,θ).
(ii) A project is low-demand if and only if Π(p∗(λζ,θ),θ) < I. The concessionaire’s receives cash
ﬂow I in all states of demand, the concession term is indeﬁnite, and the concessionaire re-
ceivesasubsidyequalto I−Π(p∗(λζ,θ),θ). Moreover, pC = p∗(λζ,θ)(and pG isirrelevant).
(iii) A project is intermediate-demand if and only if there exists at least one state θ such that
Π(p∗(λ,θ),θ)< I <Π(p∗(λζ,θ),θ).
For intermediate demand projects, the optimal contract is characterized by thresholds m
and M, with m < I < M, as follows:47
• Astateθ ishigh-demandifandonlyifΠ(p∗(λ,θ),θ)> M. Theconcessiontermisﬁnite
and the user fee is p∗(λ,θ), both during and after the concession. The concessionaire’s
discounted cash ﬂow is M and the government collects Π(p∗(λ,θ),θ)−M.
• A state θ is low-demand if and only if Π(p∗(λζ,θ) < m. The user fee is p∗(λζ), the
concession lasts indeﬁnitely, and the concessionaire receives a subsidy equal to m −
Π(p∗(λζ,θ)).
• A state θ is intermediate-demand if and only if:48
m ≤Π(p∗(λ,θ),θ)<Π(p∗(λζ,θ),θ)≤ M.
47As before, we assume u0(vmin −I) > ¯ ζu0(vmax −I). If this is not the case, then the optimal policy is described
along the lines of footnote 34.
48The assumptions we made—p∗(η,θ) increasing in η and Π(p,θ) increasing and concave for p ∈
(p∗(1,θ),pM(θ))—ensure that Π(p∗(λ,θ) < Π(p∗(λζ,θ)). Therefore, our taxonomy of states creates a partition of
the set of possible states.
26The concession lasts indeﬁnitely but no subsidies are paid. The user fee p∗(η(θ),θ) ∈
[p∗(λ,θ),p∗(λζ,θ)] is determined by solving for η in:
η−α
λζ−α
u0(m−I)=u0¡
Π(p∗(η,θ))−I
¢
=
η−α
λ−α
u0(M −I). (18)
Proof See Appendix C.4.
The economics of optimal user fees
We now discuss how user fees are optimally set, thereby providing the intuition for the re-
sults n Proposition 9. Consider ﬁrst pG, the user fee after the concession ends. There are no
more proﬁts for the concessionaire, so the planner just maximizes H(pG(θ),λ,θ). Hence η = λ
in equation (16) and pG(θ)= p∗(λ,θ).
Theeconomicintuitionisthatwhendemandisresponsivetouserfeesthereisanadditional
margin. The cash ﬂow generated by user fees in each state increases with p as long as p < pM.
Thus, it is optimal to depart from marginal cost pricing as long as the distortion at the margin
is smaller than the cost of the alternative source of funding at the margin. If ε is the elasticity of
demand andcq is the short-run marginal cost, simple manipulations show that at the optimum
the Lerner margin that maximizes (15) is such that
p∗−cq
p∗ =
λ−1
λ
×
1
ε
,
i.e., the planner chooses a user fee that creates a distortion commensurate with the cost of
public funds.
The same principle applies, mutatis mutandis to the different types of demand states dur-
ing the life of the concession. Consider optimal user fees during the concession. In a high-
demand state pC must solve
max
pC,L
©
(1−L)H(pC,α)+LH(p∗(λ))
ª
(19a)
s.t. (1−L)Π(pC)=K, (19b)
where K is a constant and we have omitted θ to reduce clutter. The interpretation of this pro-
gram is that if the concessionaire is to receive cash ﬂow K in present value under the optimal
contract, then the most efﬁcient price is pC.
The key to our result is that L is a function of pC in the constraint, since a higher user fee
shortens the concession. Thus, we use the constraint to get rid of L, and replacing in the objec-
27tive function, the optimal user fee must solve
max
pC
½
CS(pC)−H(p∗(λ))
Π(pC)
¾
.
The FOC leads to
H(p∗(λ))=CS(pC)−
CSp(pC)
Πp(pC)
Π(pC)
which, as follows from (16), implies that pC = p∗(λ) is optimal.
It may seem surprising at ﬁrst sight that pC = p∗(λ), because the planner values a dollar
in the concessionaire’s pocket at α < λ. Nevertheless, as the constraint in program (19a)-(19b)
shows, the planner can recover the extra cash ﬂow that the concessionaire receives in a high-
demand state as a result of a higher pC because the concession is shorter. This implies that at
the margin the higher revenue generated by raising the user fee during the concession substi-
tutes for distortionary taxation after the concession ends. Hence, pC = p∗(λ) is optimal.
In a low-demand state the user fee must solve
max
{pC,S}
©
H(p,α)−(λζ−α)S
ª
s.t. Π(pC)+S =K
which, after using the constraint to get rid of S, reduces to
max
pC
©
CS(pC)+λζΠ(pC)
ª
.
It follows that pC = p∗(λζ) is optimal. In low-demand states the planner can recover any extra
dollar of user fee revenue received by the concessionaire by lowering subsidy S. Hence, at the
margin the higher revenue generated by raising the user fee during the concession substitutes
forsubsidiesanditpaystodistorttheuseoftheprojectuntiltheLernermarginreaches
λζ−1
λζ ×1
ε.
Finally, consider an intermediate-demand state. On the one hand, in this state p∗(λζ) gen-
erates more cash ﬂow than the cap m allows, and at that point user fee revenue does not substi-
tute for subsidies at the margin. Thus, setting pC = p∗(λζ) would reduce the use of the project
bytoomuch. Ontheotherhand, p∗(λ)generateslessrevenuethanrequiredbytherevenuecap
M. Hence, pC = p∗(λ) would lead to excessive use of the facility. This is expressed formally by
the following condition:
η−α
λζ−α
u0(m−I)=u0¡
Π(p∗(η))−I
¢
=
η−α
λ−α
u0(M −I). (20)
28Finding m and M
In section 3 there existed a one-to-one relationship between demand states and user’s will-
ingness to pay for the project, allowing us to set v =θ. W
Asmentionedabove,whendemandrespondstouserfeesthereisnoone-to-onerelationbe-
tween demand state’s, θ, and user’s willingness to pay for the project, v. Nonetheless, demand
uncertaintycanbeconvenientlysummarizedbythejointdistributionoftheﬂowofproﬁtsgen-
erated by the project for two particular user fees, p∗(λ) and p∗(λζ), and this distribution can be
used later to characterize the thresholds m and M that deﬁne intermediate-demand states.
WedenotethejointdensityofΠ(p∗(λ,θ),θ)andΠ(p∗(λζ,θ),θ)by f (wλ,wλζ),andthecorre-
spondingmarginalc.d.f.s. byFλ(wλ)andFλζ(wλζ). Figure2depictsapartitionofthe(wλ,wλζ)-
space into high, intermediate and low demand states, for given values of m and M. Since wλζ is
always larger than wλ, the joint density only has mass above the 45-degree line. The lower-left
triangle depicts demand states where user fees add up to less than m in present value and sub-
sidies are handed out. By contrast, user fee revenue in states in the upper-right triangle adds up
to more than M and the government obtains revenue in these states.
W λζ
Wλ 0
1
1 m M
Figure 2: Partition of (wλ,wλζ)-space into high, intermediate and low demand states
This characterization of uncertainty can be used to ﬁnd m and M for an intermediate de-
mand project:
29Proposition 10 For an intermediate demand project, m and M are characterized by the conces-
sionaire’s participation constraint:
Fλζ(m)u(m−I)+
Z M
0
Z ∞
m
u
¡
Π(wλζ,wλ)−I
¢
f (wλζ,wλ)dwλζdwλ+(1−Fλ(M))u(M −I)=u(0), (21)
and
u0(m−I)= ¯ ζu0(M −I), (22)
where ¯ ζ = (λζ−α)/(λ−α) and Π(wλ,wλζ) is a shortcut for the expectation of Π(p∗(η(θ),θ),θ)
conditional on Π(p∗(λ,θ),θ)= wλ and Π(p∗(λζ,θ),θ)= wλζ.
Proof The ﬁrst expression is obtained from (17a) and the fact that the optimal policy is of the
two-threshold type. The second expression follows from (18). Appendix C.5 includes an alter-
native derivation of the second expression that provides additional insights.
Implementation
The optimal contract can be implemented with a competitive auction. In common with the
inﬁnitely inelastic demand case, the planner does not need to know the up-front cost of the
project or the ﬁrms’ utility function. Firms bid on the lower and upper thresholds m and M
and the contract is adjudicated to the concessionaire that bids the highest value of aggregate
welfare. As before, aggregate welfare can be split up into the contribution of high, intermediate
and low demand states, leading to:49
W(M,m)=Whigh+Wint+Wlow,
with
Whigh =
Z ∞
M
[CS(w)+αM +λ(w −M)]dFλ(w),
Wint =
Z M
0
Z ∞
m
[CS(p∗(η(wλζ,wλ)))+αΠ(η(wλζ,wλ))]f (wλζ,wλ)dwλζdwλ,
Wlow =
Z m
0
[CS(w)+αm+λζ(w −m)]dFλζ(w).
Even though more information on demand is needed to set up the auction than in the case of
inelastic demand, a good approximation to the optimal auction can be obtained if the govern-
ment provides the distribution of the present value of proﬁts under two particular sets of user
49See Appendix C.5 for the derivation of the expressions that follow.
30fees: those corresponding to the shadow cost of subsidies for the project, p∗(λζ), and those
reﬂecting the shadow cost of funds elsewhere in the economy, p∗(λ).
5.2 Moral hazard
In this section we allow for demand that depends on unobservable and costly effort by the con-
cessionaire. An additional motive to have the ﬁrm bear risk emerges in this case, as risk now
helps induce optimal levels of effort by the franchise holder. As before, two thresholds, m and
M, sufﬁce to partition states into high, intermediate and low-demand states. Even though now
total revenue collected by the concessionaire increases with v, subsidies are paid out only in
low demand states (v <m), while the government collects user-fees only in high demand states
(v > M).
31The planner’s problem
We embed the model of section 3 in a simple moral hazard framework. The concessionaire
can exert costly effort, which affects the probability distribution of demand realizations. The
density f (v|²) summarizes uncertainty about the present discounted value of user fee revenue,
for an indeﬁnite contract, when the concessionaire chooses effort level ².50 We assume the
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds, so that `(v,²) ≡
∂f
∂²(v|²)/f (v|²) is increasing
in v for all ²; i.e., effort increases the probability of higher realizations of demand. The utility of
the concessionaire, U(y,²) = u(y)−k², k > 0, is separable into net revenue and effort, where y
denotes the present value of user fees collected by the concessionaire and ²≥0 the concession-
aire’s effort.
The planner chooses effort ², and revenue and subsidy schedules R(v) and S(v), to solve the
following program
min
{R(v),S(v),²}
Z
[(λ−α)R(v)+(λζ−α)S(v)−λv] f (v|²)dv (23a)
s.t.
Z
u(R(v)+S(v)−I)f (v|²)dv ≥u(0)+k², (23b)
²=argmax
²0
½Z
u(R(v)+S(v)−I)f (v|²0)dv −k²0
¾
, (23c)
0≤R(v)≤ v, (23d)
S(v)≥0. (23e)
Comparing program (6a)-(6d) with program (23a)-(23e) it can be seen that the term λv has
been added because now effort affects the p.d.f. of users’ present discounted willingness to pay.
Constraint(23b)istheconcessionaire’sparticipationconstraint, and(23c)istheincentivecom-
patibility constraint.
Under standard assumptions,51 we can use the First Order Approach to examine the prop-
erties of the solution. The concessionaire’s incentive compatibility constraint can be replaced
by Z
u(R(v)+S(v)−I)`(v,²)f (v|²)dv =k. (24)
Denoting by µ > 0 the multiplier associated with (23b) and τ > 0 the multiplier associated
50In this section, effort is an action undertaken by the concessionaire during the construction phase that affects
demand for the infrastructure service both during and after the concession.
51E.g., strict concavity of the agent’s utility as a function of ² and the convexity of the distribution function con-
dition, see, e.g., Proposition 5.2 in Laffont and Martimort [2002].
32with (24),52 we have that the Lagrangian of the problem is:
L =
Z
[(λ−α)R(v)+(λζ−α)S(v)−λv] f (v|²)dv − µ
·Z
u(R(v)+S(v)−I)f (v|²)dv −k²
¸
−τ
Z
u(R(v)+S(v)−I)`(v,²)f (v|²)dv. (25)
The ﬁrst order condition w.r.t. to ², combined with (24), provides an expression for τ:
τ=
R
[(λ−α)R(v)+(λζ−α)S(v)−λv]`(v,²)f (v|²)dv
R
u(R(v)+S(v)−I)
∂2f
∂e2 (v,²)dv
.
Optimal contract when ζ=1
When ζ = 1, it follows from the Lagrangian (25) that the distinction between user fees and
subsidiesisirrelevant, asbefore, andtheoptimalpolicycanbedescribedexclusivelyintermsof
total revenue, T (v) ≡ R(v)+S(v). The irrelevance result also holds in this case, and λ > 1 does
not make the case for a PPP .
It is no longer optimal to grant full insurance to the concessionaire. Indeed, the FOC with
respect to T (v) leads to
u0(T (v)−I)=
λ−α
µ+τ`(v,²)
, (26)
and the MLRP implies that T (v) is strictly increasing in v. It also follows that, contrary to the
resultsobtainedinsection3,theconcessionaire’saveragerevenueislargerthan I,bothbecause
he bears risk and because he must be compensated for exerting costly effort.
To further characterize the optimal contract with moral hazard, we assume that G(v,²) ≡
u0(v −I)[µ+τ`(v,²)] is strictly decreasing in v for all feasible ².53 This assumption implies that,
given µ and τ, there exists M such that
u0(M −I)=
λ−α
µ+τ`(M,²)
. (27)
The optimal contract then falls into one of the three following cases:
52See Appendix D for formal proofs showing that µ>0 and τ>0.
53To derive this condition from ﬁrst principles is not trivial, since µ and τ are multipliers that vary with the prob-
lem’s parameters and, at least in principle, can take any positive value. Appendix D derives sufﬁcient conditions
for ∂G/∂v <0, in terms of the problem’s deep parameters, for the case of an exponential distribution and constant
absolute risk aversion. As discussed in that appendix, all we really need is a weaker single-crossing condition.
33Proposition 11 Assume ζ=1, G(v,ε)≡u0(v −I)[µ+τ`(v,²)] strictly decreasing in v for all feasi-
ble ε, and deﬁne M as in (27). Then:
(i) If M < vmin: T (v)< v for all v ∈[vmin,vmax].
(ii) If M > vmax: T (v)> v for all v ∈[vmin,vmax].
(iii) If M ∈[vmin,vmax]: T (v)< v for v ∈[vmin,M) and T (v)> v for v ∈(M,vmax].
Proof See Appendix D.
The above proposition is a standard result in principal-agent theory: To induce socially op-
timal effort, subject to the incentive compatibility constraint, the principal designs a contract
where the agent bears risk. The increase in demand compensates for the additional revenue
required by the agent because he is not fully insured. Furthermore, the MLRP ensures that total
revenue is increasing in v, and there exists a threshold M such that the ﬁrm is subsidized when
v < M while the government shares in user fee revenue when v > M. Depending on the value
of M, the project may be high- or low-demand, but there are no intermediate demand projects,
i.e.,thosethat,forarangeofvaluesof v,havenoeffectongovernmentﬁnances. Forthesestates
to appear in the optimal contract, it is necessary that ζ>1. We turn to this case next.
Optimal contract when ζ>1
Figure 3 depicts the optimal contract when ζ > 1. To derive this contract formally, we ﬁrst
notethatuser-feesdominatesubsidiesasasourceofrevenuefortheﬁrmwhenζ>1. Therefore
subsidy ﬁnancing only takes place when R(v) = 0. It follows that the FOC with respect to R(v)
for a state v where the concession term is ﬁnite leads to:
u0(R(v)−I)=
λ−α
µ+τ`(v,²)
, (28)
while the FOC with respect to S(v) for a state where subsidies are paid out yields
u0(v +S(v)−I)=
λζ−α
µ+τ`(v,²)
. (29)
Deﬁne M and m via:
u0(M −I)=
λ−α
µ+τ`(M,²)
, (30a)
u0(m−I)=
λζ−α
µ+τ`(m,²)
, (30b)
34Figure 3: Optimal contract with moral hazard and ζ>1  
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given µ, τ and ². It then follows from u00 < 0, (28), (29), and the assumption that G(v,²) is de-
creasinginv,thatstateswithv ≥ M arehigh-demandstates,whilestatesv ≤m arelow-demand
states, in the sense that the government collects user fees in the former case and pays subsidies
in the latter.
Contrary to the optimal contract for the case with no moral hazard depicted in Figure 1, the
concessionaire’s revenue is not equal across all high-demand states or all low-demand states.
But the gap between m and M emerges for precisely the same reason as before, namely that
subsidy ﬁnance is more expensive than user fee revenue at the margin. Moral hazard does not
change the basic structure of the optimal contract, even though now the concessionaire’s total
revenue is strictly increasing in v.
Figure3showsthatforanintermediate-demandprojectwithζ>1wehavearangeofvalues
of v wherethecontractlastsindeﬁnitelyandtherearenosubsidies. Thisrangeofintermediate-
demand states (and intermediate-demand projects) emerges only when ζ>1, leading to an in-
creaseinriskbornebythefranchiseholderbeyondthelevelpredictedbythestandardprincipal-
agency model for the case ζ = 1. To make this statement precise, we note that it follows from
the MLRP and the deﬁnition of m and M that if vH denotes a high-demand state and vL a low-
35demand state, then:
u0(vL −I)= ¯ ζ
µ+τ`(vH,²)
µ+τ`(vL,²)
u0(vH −I). (31)
The need to induce effort would make revenue in state vH greater than that in state vL even
when ζ=1. But because ζ>1, (which is equivalent to ¯ ζ>1), the difference in revenue between
states is ampliﬁed, since (31) implies
u0(m−I)> ¯ ζu0(M −I),
whilewithouteffortwehaveanequality(see(12)). Forexample,forCARAutilitywithcoefﬁcient
of absolute risk aversion A:
M −m =
1
A
·
log(¯ ζ)+log
µ
µ+τ`(M,²)
µ+τ`(m,²)
¶¸
,
which, because of the MLRP , is larger than the corresponding expression when effort does not
matter:
M −m =
1
A
log(¯ ζ).
It is time to take stock:
Proposition 12 Assume ζ>1, G(v,ε)≡u0(v −I)[µ+τ`(v,²)] strictly decreasing in v for all feasi-
ble ε, and deﬁne M and m as in (30a)-(30b). Then T (v) is increasing in v and:
(i) If M < vmin: T (v)=R(v)< v for all v ∈[vmin,vmax] and no subsidies are paid (high-demand
project).
(ii)Ifm > vmax: T (v)> v forallv ∈[vmin,vmax]andsubsidiesarepaidinallstates(low-demand
project).
(iii) If vmin <m < M < vmax:
• v > M corresponds to high demand states, with no subsidies and a ﬁnite contract
length.
• v <m corresponds to low demand states, with indeﬁnite contracts and subsidies
• m < v < M corresponds to intermediate demand states, with indeﬁnite contracts and
no implications for the government budget.
36Application: Proﬁt sharing and proﬁt guarantees in the real world
InmanyPPPcontractsthecounterpartofminimumrevenueguaranteeshasbeenarevenue
(and sometimes proﬁt) sharingclause. We argue that these contracts are far from optimal when
effort matters.
The optimal contract involves both a state-dependent subsidy in low-demand states and a
state-dependent revenue cap above which the government collects all revenues. Moreover, the
concessiontermisstatecontingentinhigh-demandstates,andtheconcessionlastsindeﬁnitely
whensubsidiesarepaidout. Bothcharacteristicsareseldom, ifever, observedinrealworldPPP
contracts. Normally, the guarantee leads to a constant revenue for the concessionaire in low
demand states, and the term of the concession is ﬁxed and ﬁnite.
Note, moreover, that the choice between the incentive contract described above and the
contract for the case without moral hazard discussed earlier (sections 3 and 5.1) depends on
the extent to which demand is exogenous, or should it be endogenous, the extent to which
the concessionaire’s actions affecting demand are enforceable. When these conditions hold—
as in the case for highways, which account for more than half of the world’s expenditures on
PPPs54—the contract without moral hazard applies and proﬁt sharing arrangements are not
justiﬁed. By contrast, when the optimal contract needs to be high-powered, then an incentive
contract probably is desirable.
6 Conclusion: Are PPPs public or private?
As the worldwide enthusiasm about privatizations waned, PPPs began to boom. One reason
governments like PPPs is that they provide a temporary transfer of most of the beneﬁts of own-
ership of the assets at stake to private ﬁrms, thus avoiding criticism from those who oppose
privatization. At the same time, because some ownership rights are transferred, governments
can also claim that private sector participation is being advanced.
This raises the question of whether PPPs should be viewed as temporary privatizations, or
simplyasanotheroptiontoprocurepublicservices. SomecharacteristicsofPPPsclearlyresem-
ble a privatization. For example, Bennet and Iossa (2006) argue that in addition to bundling, a
PPP gives the concessionaire ownership rights over assets and control rights over how to pro-
duce the service.55 Furthermore, our analysis has shown that the optimal risk-sharing contract
allocates all user fees to the concessionaire for as long as the concession lasts, as in the case of
54See Hemming (2006).
55Bennet and Iossa (2006) argue that bundling is not a sufﬁcient condition for a PPP since the could contract a
bundled service, while still keeping ownership of the assets and user fees, as under conventional provision.
37a privatized ﬁrm.
Yetthispaper’sresultscanbeusedtoarguethat, asfarastheriskproﬁleofthegovernment’s
budget is concerned, PPPs are much closer to public provision than to privatization. Our start-
ing point to derive this insight is that when thinking about the risk allocation implied by PPPs,
whatmattersistheintertemporal riskproﬁleofcashﬂows,nottheyear-to-yearriskproﬁle. This
hasinterestingimplications: forlow-andhigh-demandprojects,anoptimalPPPcontractrepli-
cates the net cash ﬂow streams of conventional (‘public’) provision, state by state. Essentially,
all residual risk is transferred to the government, and the concessionaire recovers I in all states,
as in the case of conventional provision.
For intermediate-demand projects, our results show that a risk-sharing arrangement is op-
timal. The extent to which the ﬁrm bears risk now depends on the extent to which subsidies
are a more costly source of ﬁnancing than user fees, as captured by the parameter ¯ ζ. When sub-
sidy ﬁnancing is very inefﬁcient, it is too expensive to reduce the ﬁrm’s risk via subsidies, and
it is best to have the ﬁrm bear most (sometimes all) of the risk. PPPs resemble privatizations
in this case. On the other hand, if subsidy ﬁnancing is only slightly less efﬁcient than user-fee
ﬁnancing, the minimum income guarantee and the cap on user fee revenues that characterize
the optimal contract are very similar, and the government bears most of the risk. As with high-
and low-demand projects, risk sharing arrangements resemble public provision in this case.
Under privatization, the project is sold for a one-time payment and all risk is transferred to
the ﬁrm. Moreover, the link between the project and the public budget is permanently severed.
ThisisnotthecasewithaPPP ,whereatthemargincashﬂowsfromtheprojectalwayssubstitute
for either taxes or subsidies. The conclusion, then, is that from a public ﬁnance perspective
there is a strong presumption that PPPs are analogous to conventional provision—in essence,
they remain public projects, and should be treated as such.
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41Appendix
A When is a project socially valuable?
A.1 Model
We deﬁne producer surplus as
PS(v)=R(v)+S(v)−I.
Let βp stand for the fraction of the private willingness to pay that can be collected by charging
user fees over the life of the infrastructure project (this is a generalization of our assumption
βp =1 in the body of the paper) and let E be the externality generated by the project. Consumer
surplus is:56
CS(v)=(λ−1)
£
βpv −R(v)
¤
+[v −R(v)−λζS(v)]+E.
Hence
CS(v)+αPS(v)=(λ−1)
£
βpv −R(v)
¤
+[v −R(v)−λζS(v)]+α(R(v)+S(v)−I)+E.
=
£
(λ−1)βp+1
¤
v −(λ−α)R(v)−(λζ−α)S(v)−αI +E.
Let γv be the maximum fraction of consumer willingness to pay that can be transferred to the
concessionaire under a PPP .57 Clearly, γ≤βp. Let
©
R∗(v),S∗(v)
ª
solve
max
{R(v),S(v)}
Z
[CS(v)+αPS(v)] f (v)dv
s.t.
Z
u(R(v)+S(v)−I)f (v)dv ≥u(0),
0≤R(v)≤γv
S(v)≥0.
The expected social value of the project is
SV ≡
Z ©£
(λ−1)βp+1
¤
v −(λ−α)R∗(v)−(λζ−α)S∗(v)−αI
ª
f (v)dv +E. (32)
We can now use (32) to explore the conditions required for SV >0.
56Note that the unpaid fraction (1−βp) remains as part of consumer surplus with or without the project.
57This parameter can be used to model a legally mandated maximum length of a PPP (e.g. 50 years in Chile). βp,
on the other hand, models the ability to appropriate user’s willingness to pay.
42A.2 The social value of a project
A high-demand project In this case I ≤ γvmin, R∗(v) = I and S∗(v) = 0 for all v. Then a high-
demand project is socially worthwhile if and only if
SV =
Z ©£
(λ−1)βp+1
¤
v −λI
ª
f (v)dv +E ≥0.
If, in addition βp =1, then the condition simpliﬁes to
SV =
Z
λ(v −I) f (v)dv +E ≥0. (33)
Note that in the case of a high-demand project, the social value does not depend on α. Since
λ > 1, the social value of the project increases with βp. Finally, when βp = 1, expression (33)
has a simple interpretation: the social value of the project is the sum, over all demand states, of
private surplus v −I, augmented by the fact that this surplus allows the government to reduce
distortionary taxation, plus the value of the externality.
A low-demand project In this case I >γvmax, S∗(v)+R∗(v)= I and R∗(v)=γv for all states v.
Hence, after some algebraic manipulation,
SV =
Z ©£
(λ−1)βp+1
¤
v −λI −λ(ζ−1)(I −γv)
ª
f (v)dv +E ≥0.
If, in addition, γ=1 (which implies βp =1), this condition becomes
SV =
Z £
λ(v −I)−λ(ζ−1)(I −γv)
¤
f (v)dv +E ≥0.
This expression is the same as (33), but for the fact that now the project must bear an additional
cost in states where subsidies are paid: λ(ζ−1)(I −γv). Moreover, since
S∗(v)= I −R∗(v)= I −γv,
the social value of the project is (locally) increasing in γ when γ<βp.
An intermediate-demand project In this case, R∗(v) = M > I, and S∗(v) = 0 in high-demand
states. Hence, social surplus in such a state s is
SV (s)=
£
(λ−1)βp+1
¤
v +(λ−α)M −αI +E
In intermediate-demand states R∗(v)=γv and S∗(v)=0. Hence, social surplus is SV(s) =
£
(λ−1)βp+1
¤
v −λγv +α(γv −I)+E
43In low-demand states R∗(v)=γv and γv +S∗(v)=m < I. Hence, social surplus is SV(s) =
£
(λ−1)βp+1
¤
v −λ(1−ζ)γν−λζm+α(m−I)+E
This implies that the condition is
SV =
Z ©
(λ−1)βpv +v −αI
ª
f (v)dv − (λ−α)
·
M(1−F(M))+
Z M
m
γv f (v)dv +mF(m)
¸
−λ(ζ−1)
Z m
vmin
(m−γv)f (v)dv + E ≥ 0.
B When is a PPP better than conventional unbundled provi-
sion?
B.1 Modeling the differences between conventional provision and PPPs
The literature has identiﬁed several reasons for the differences between PPPs and conventional
provision.
1. As we point out, government spending may be inefﬁcient in general, in addition to the
costs created by distortionary taxation. This is captured by the parameter ζ in our model.
2. Hart(2003)suggestedthatbundlingmaystimulatecostsavings,becausedesignisadapted
to lower operation costs. The point is that the procurement choice by itself may affect
costs. In our framework this can be modeled by assuming that under conventional (un-
bundled) provision total costs are σI instead of I. If the public sector is more efﬁcient in
building a particular project, then σ<1, while σ>1 if the private sector is more efﬁcient.
3. Hart (2003) has also pointed out that the private concessionaire may have incentives to
save at the expense of quality of service. I other projects, a private concessionaire may
responde better better to the needs of users. We may assume that user willingness to pay
is ηv with conventional provision and v with a private concessionaire. If the public sector
is more effective in creating welfare for consumers, then η > 1, while η < 1 if the private
sector is more effective.
4. The capacity to charge users of the infrastructure may depend on the way the infrastruc-
ture is provided. We introduce a parameter βtr that captures the fraction of user’s willing-
ness to pay that can be effectively charged under conventional provision.
Assumption 1 βtr ≤βp.
44It follows that with conventional provision, consumer surplus is
CS(v)=
£
(λ−1)βtr+η
¤
v −λζσI +E.
Social surplus is thus Z ©£
(λ−1)βtr+η
¤
v −λζσI
ª
f (v)dv +E. (34)
B.2 PPPs vs. conventional provision
Substracting (34) from (32) above, yields that a PPP is better than conventional provision if
Z ©
(λ−1)(βp−βtr)v −
£
(λ−α)R∗(v)+(λζ−α)S∗(v)
¤ª
f (v)dv
+
Z £
(1−η)v +(λζσ−α)I
¤
f (v)dv ≥0. (35)
The ﬁrst integral contains the terms that are central to our paper. (λ−1)(βp −βtr)v indicates
that one advantage of PPPs is that they substitute for distortionary taxation. If PPP’s enhance
the ability to charge users, this is a point in their favor over conventional provision. This term
disappears if βp =βtr =1. The second term, (λ−α)R∗(v)+(λζ−α)S∗(v), explains the structure
of the optimal contract. As a means of ﬁnancing the project, subsidies are more expensive than
project revenues, which is captured by λζ−α>λ−α.
Thesecondintegralcontainstwotermsidentiﬁedintheliterature(inparticular,Hart(2003)),
as potential advantages or disadvantages of PPPs. The ﬁrst term, (1−η)v, indicates that gross
consumer surplus may increase or decrease with a PPP , depending on the sign of 1−η, i.e.,
on whether the concessionaire is better at providing the servie to users. The second term,
(λζσ−α)I, shows that PPP may reduce the costs of provision. One possible reason is that sub-
sidy spending is by itself wasteful; this is captured with ζ > 1. The other reason is that a PPP
structure by itself may alter incentives in such a way that the direct cost of the project may be
smaller, for example, because bundling stimulates better design or by reducing total costs dur-
ing the duration of the concession. This is captured by the term σ>1.
We can now develop speciﬁc expressions for each type of project.
A high-demand project In this case I ≤ γvmin, R∗(v) = I and S∗(v) = 0 for all v. Thus, substi-
tuting into (35) and rearranging yields that a PPP is better if
Z £
(λ−1)(βp−βtr)v
¤
f (v)dv +
Z £
(1−η)v +λ(ζσ−1)I
¤
f (v)dv ≥0.
Result 1 Withahigh-demandprojectitisirrelevantwhetherproductiveefﬁcienciesareachieved
in ζ or σ. Moreover, whether a PPP beats conventional provision does not depend on α.
45A low-demand project In this case I >γvmax, S∗(v)+R∗(v)= I and R∗(v)=γv for all states v.
Substituting into (35) and rearranging yields that a PPP is better if
Z £
(λ−1)(βp−βtr)v −λ(ζ−1)(I −γv)
¤
f (v)dv +
Z £
(1−η)v +λ(ζσ−1)I
¤
f (v)dv ≥0.
An intermediate-demand project In this case, evaluation of (35) in the different cases and
rearranging yields that a PPP is preferable if
Z ©
(λ−1)(βp−βtr)v +(1−η)v +(λζσ−α)I
ª
f (v)dv
−(λ−α)
·
M(1−F(M))+
Z M
m
γv f (v)dv +mF(m)
¸
−λ(ζ−1)
Z m
vmin
(m−γv)f (v)dv ≥0.
C Proofs of Propositions
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Since u is concave, applying Jensen’s inequality to the concessionaire’s participation constraint
leads to
u(
Z
[R(v)+S(v)]f (v)dv −I)≥
Z
u(R(v)+S(v)−I)f (v)dv =u(0).
And since u is strictly increasing, the above inequality implies that
E[R]+E[S]≥ I,
where E[R] =
R
R(v)f (v)dv denotes the expected revenue before demand is realized and E[S]
denotes expected government expenditure on subsidies.
It follows that if the solution to
min
R≥0,S≥0
(λ−α)E[R]+(λζ−α)E[S] (36)
s.t. E[R]+E[S]≥ I,
satisﬁes (5b)–(5d), then it solves program (5a)-(5d) as well.
Hence, if ζ = 1, any combination of revenue and subsidy schedules that satisﬁes (5c), (5d),
and R(v)+S(v)= I for all v, solves the planner’s problem.
46C.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Having established the form of the optimal contract, the planner’s problem is equivalent to
ﬁnding m and M that minimize
M(1−F(M))+
Z M
0
v f (v)dv + ¯ ζF(m)
Z m
0
(m−v)f (v)dv, (37)
subject to the concessionaire’s participation constraint (11). Noting that (11) implicitly deﬁnes
M as a function of m, we have that:
M0(m)=−
F(m)u0(m−I)
(1−F(M))u0(M −I)
. (38)
Asimilarcalculationshowsthattherateatwhich M andm havetochangetokeeptheobjective
function (37) unchanged is given by
M0(m)=−
¯ ζF(m)
1−F(M)
. (39)
Equating (38) and (39) for M0(m) leads to (12) and completes the proof.58
C.3 Proof of Proposition 5
With the assumptions and notation introduced in the main text we prove that:
M0(ζ)=
λF(m)
(λζ−α)F(m)CARA(M −I)+(λ−α)(1−F(M))CARA(m−I)
,
m0(ζ)=−
λ(λ−α)(1−F(M))
(λζ−α)[(λζ−α)F(m)CARA(M −I)+(λ−α)(1−F(M))CARA(m−I)]
,
M0(ζ)−m0(ζ)=
λ[(λζ−α)F(m)+(λ−α)(1−F(M))]
(λζ−α)[(λζ−α)F(m)CARA(M −I)+(λ−α)(1−F(M))CARA(m−I)]
.
It follows that risk borne by the concessionaire increases with the social cost of subsidies, ζ.
Furthermore,(λζ−α)(M0(ζ)−m0(ζ))/λtakesavaluebetween1/CARA(m−I)and1/CARA(M−I).
We deﬁneC(I)≡CARA(M −I)/CARA(m−I) and also show that:
m0(I)=1 +
¯ ζC(I)
R M
m u0(v −I)f (v)dv
[¯ ζC(I)F(m)+1−F(M)]u0(m−I)
,
M0(I)=1 +
R M
m u0(v −I)f (v)dv
[¯ ζC(I)F(m)+1−F(M)]u0(M −I)
,
M0(I)−m0(I)= ¯ ζ(1−C(I))
R M
m u0(v −I)f (v)dv
[¯ ζC(I)F(m)+1−F(M)]u0(m−I)
.
58The above proof assumes that F(m)>0 and F(M)<1. Footnote 34 outlines the proof when this is not the case.
47It follows that m and M grow faster than I. Also, for a concessionaire with decreasing absolute
risk aversion, the wedge between M and m increases with I, while it does not depend on I for a
concessionaire with constant absolute risk aversion.
Proof Implicit differentiation of (12) with respect to ζ and a bit of algebra leads to:
M0(ζ)=
λ
(λζ−α)CARA(M −I)
+
CARA(m−I)
CARA(M −I)
m0(ζ).
Implicitly differentiating (11) with respect to ¯ ζ leads to:
M0(ζ)=−
(λζ−α)F(m)
(λ−α)(1−F(M)))
m0(ζ).
Both expressions above lead to the comparative statics results for ¯ ζ.
Implicit differentiation of (12) with respect to I leads to:
m0(I)−1
M0(I)−1
= ¯ ζC(I).
Implicit differentiation of (11) with respect to I leads to:
F(m)u0(m−I)[m0(I)−1]+
Z M
m
u0(v −I)f (v)dv +(1−F(M))u0(M −I)[M0(I)−1]=0.
The three comparative statics expressions in I now follow easily.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof Part(i) Itfollowsimmediatelyfromtheplanner’sobjectivefunctionthatpG(θ)= p∗(λ,θ)
when γ<1, that is, when the contract length is ﬁnite.
Toderivetheexpressionsfor pC(θ),considerﬁrstthecasewherethecontractlengthisﬁnite.
We ﬁx the concessionaire’s proﬁts, and choose the price that maximizes the planner’s welfare,
that is, we solve:
max
p,γ
γH(p,α)+(1−γ)H∗(λ)
s.t. γΠ(p)=K,
where we have dropped θ from our notation, H∗(λ)≡ H(p∗(λ)) and p stands for pC. Using the
constraint to get rid of γ in the objective function leads to the following equivalent problem:
max
p
CS(p)−H∗(λ)
Π(p)
.
48The corresponding ﬁrst order condition leads to:
H∗(λ)=CS(p)−
CS0(p)
Π0(p)
Π(p)
and it follows from (16) that p = p∗(λ) is optimal in this case.
Part (ii) Next we consider the case where S >0 and maximize the planner’s objective function
over p and S, keeping ﬁxed the concessionaire’s total proﬁts:
max
p,S
H(p,α)−(λζ−α)S
s.t. Π(p)+S =K.
This time we use the constraint to get rid of S in the objective function, which leads to:
max
p
H(p,α)+(λζ−α)Π(p),
which, by the deﬁnition of H, is equivalent to choosing the user fee that maximizes H(p,λζ). It
follows that pC = p∗(λζ) in this case.
Part (iii) We consider two intermediate demand states, θ1 and θ2, and ﬁnd the optimal price
in each state subject to a ﬁxed expected utility for the concessionaire. That is, we solve:
max
p1,p2
H(p1,α,θ1)f (θ1)+H(p2,α,θ2)f (θ2)
s.t. u
¡
Π(p1,θ)−I
¢
f (θ1)+u
¡
Π(p2,θ)−I
¢
f (θ2)=K.
The Lagrangian for this problem is
L(p1,p2)= H(p1,α,θ1)f (θ1)+H(p2,α,θ2)f (θ2)+µ[u0
1f (θ1)+u0
2f (θ2)],
where u0
i =u(Π(pi,v)−I), i =1,2, and µ denotes the multiplier for the concessionaire’s partici-
pation constraint.
Using the ﬁrst order conditions in p1 and p2 to get rid of µ then leads to:
u0
1
u0
2
=
CSp(p1,θ)
Πp(p1,θ1) +α
CSp(p2,θ2)
Πp(p1,θ1) +α
.
Deﬁne η1 and η2 via p1 = p∗(η1,θ1) and p2 = p∗(η2,θ2). Since θ1 and θ2 are intermediate de-
mand states and Π(p∗(η),θ) is increasing in η, we have that ηi ∈ (λ,λζ), i = 1,2. The above
49expression combined with (16) implies that:
u0
1
u0
2
=
η1−α
η2−α
.
A similar argument, with an intermediate and a low (high) demand state instead of two inter-
mediate states, leads to the second (third) equality in (20).
C.5 Proof of Proposition 10
We use Figure 2 to extend (37) and (38) to the more general setting considered here and in this
way prove (22). We show that the planner substitutes m and M at a rate:
M0(m)=−
¯ ζFλζ(m)
1−Fλ(M)
, (40)
while the rate at which m and M are substituted along the concessionaire’s participation con-
straint satisﬁes:
M0(m)=−
Fλζ(m)u0(m−I)
(1−Fλ(M))u0(M −I)
. (41)
Equating both rates of substitution leads to (22).
Consider the impact on the concessionaire’s participation constraint of an increase of m by
∆m. Demand states than originally enjoyed a minimum revenue guarantee of m see this guar-
antee increase by ∆m, thereby increasing the concessionaire’s expected utility by Fλζ(m)u0(m−
I)∆m. We also have a small fraction of states—those with vλζ ∈ [m,m+∆m]—that now have a
guarantee and did not have one before. And the user-fee in these states is somewhat smaller
once they have a minimum revenue guarantee. In any case, the contribution of these marginal
states to the concessionaire’s expected utility is of second order in ∆m and can therefore be
ignored.
A similar argument shows that a decrease of M by ∆M leads to a decrease of the conces-
sionaire’s expected utility of (1−Fλ(M)u0(M −I)∆M, where again we ignore higher order terms
in ∆M. Equating to zero the expected utility change associated with an increase in m and a
decrease of M leads to (41).
Toderive(40)weﬁrstuseourtwo-thresholdcharacterizationoftheoptimalcontracttosim-
plify the planner’s objective function (17a). In high demand states we have γΠ(p∗(λ))= M and
therefore
[αγ+λ(1−γ)]Π=λΠ−(λ−α)M.
We use this expression to get rid of γ in the expression for welfare in high demand states:
Whigh =CS(p∗(λ)) + αM + λ(Π(p∗(λ))−M). (42)
In low demand states we have Π+S =m, which allows us to get rid of S in the planner’s welfare
50function for these states:
Wlow =CS(p∗(λζ)) + αm + λζ(Π(p∗(λζ))−m) (43)
Finally, in intermediate demand states we have:
Wint =CS(p∗(η)) + αΠ(p∗(η)), (44)
with η∈(λ,λζ) determined from (20).
Consider next the effect on total welfare of an increase of ∆m in m and a decrease of ∆M
in M. Comparing (42)–(44) it is clear that the change in welfare due to marginal ﬁrms—those
close to m or M—is second order, since η≈λζ for ﬁrms with wλζ close to m and η≈λ for ﬁrms
with wλ close to M. It follows that, as in the previous case, the ﬁrst order aggregate change in
welfare is due to inframarginal low demand states and inframarginal high demand states. The
subsidy paid out in the former states increases signiﬁcantly, leading to a welfare reduction of
(λζ−α)Fλζ(m)∆m. And user fees freed upby the decrease in M allow the government to reduce
distortions elsewhere in the economy, increasing welfare by (λ−α)(1−Fλ(M))∆M. Equating to
zero the total change in welfare leads to (40) and completes the proof.
D Moral hazard and a single-crossing property
Proof of Proposition 11
A straightforward adaptation of the proof of standard moral hazard results can be used
to prove that T (v) is strictly increasing. For example, following the argument in the proof of
Proposition 5.2 in Laffont and Martimort (2002) leads to
µ = (λ−α)E
·
1
u0(T (v)−I)
¸
,
τ =
λ−α
k
Cov
µ
1
u0(T (v)−I)
, u(T (v)−I)
¶
.
From u0 > 0 it then follows that µ > 0, while the fact that u and u0 covary in opposite direc-
tions implies that τ > 0. The MLRP and (26) then imply that T (v) is strictly increasing in v.
The fact that T is strictly increasing in v does not imply that it crosses the 45-degree line
only once and from above, thereby ensuring the existence of M such that states with v < M are
low-demand(theyrequireasubsidy)whilestatewithv > M arehigh-demand(ﬁniteterm). This
requires that the function G(v,²) satisﬁes a single-crossing property. We consider this property
below, working with the more general case where ζ>1.
Problem Set Up
51We partition demand states into three sets:
• H : outcomeswhereitisoptimaltohaveaﬁnitecontracttermandthereforenosubsidies,
• L: outcomes where subsidies are called for and therefore the contract lasts indeﬁnitely,
• I: outcomes where the contract lasts indeﬁnitely but no subsidies are involved.
With the notation introduced in section 5.2, let:
G(v,²)=u0(v −I)[µ+τ`(v,ε)]. (45)
The ﬁrst order conditions (30a)-(30b) and u00 <0 imply that
H ={v :G(v,²)<λ−α},
I ={v :λ−α≤G(v,²)≤λζ−α},
L ={v :G(v,²)>λζ−α},
where ² is set equal to the value that maximizes the planner’s objective function, which is as-
sumed positive.
We want to show that there exist constants m and M, with m < M, such that H , I and
L are characterized by v > M, m ≤ v ≤ M and v < m, respectively.59 When ` ≡ 0 in (45), this
follows directly from u00 < 0. Yet once effort matters, we must show that, for all feasible values
of ², G(v,²) crosses the horizontal lines λζ−α and λ−α only once and from above (‘single-
crossing property’). The problem is not trivial because µ and τ are multipliers that vary with
the problem’s parameters and, in principle, can take any positive values.
A particular case
In what follows we assume that the distribution of users’ willingness to pay follows an expo-
nential distribution with mean θ that increases with effort ². The concessionaire has constant
absolute risk aversion A. In the remainder of this appendix we ﬁnd conditions on θ, k and A so
that the optimal contract derived in section 5.2 is of the two threshold type.
The distribution of discounted demand follows an exponential distribution with mean θ(²),
with θ0(²)>0:
f (v|²)=
1
θ
e−v/θ.
It follows that:
`(v,²)=
θ0
θ
hv
θ
−1
i
and therefore
∂`(v,²)
∂v
=
θ0
θ2 >0.
59Since we do not know the value of ² a priori, this must hold for all feasible values of ².
52and the MLRP holds.
Since the concessionaire has constant risk aversion, denoted by A in what follows, the con-
cessionaire’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints lead to:
Z
u0(T(v)−I)f (v|²)dv =1−kA², (46)
Z
u0(T(v)−I)`(v,²)f (v|²)dv =−kA. (47)
A useful identity
The ﬁrst order conditions (28) and (29) imply that for all v we have:
λ−α≤u0(T(v)−I)[µ+τ`(v,²)]≤λζ−α.
Integrating over v we then have:
µ
Z
u0(T(v)−I)f (v|²)dv +τ
Z
u0(T(v)−I)`(v,²)f (v|²)dv =C,
with λ−α≤C ≤λζ−α. Substituting (46) and (47) in this expression leads to:
(1−kA²)µ=τkA+C. (48)
Since µ, τ andC are positive, this expression implies that
²<
1
kA
.
Thus, as expected, optimal effort is smaller when the concessionaire is more risk averse or the
cost of effort is higher. It also follows from (48) that:
µ
τ
=
kA
1−kA²
+
C
τ(1−kA²)
,
and since kA²<1 andC >0, this implies that:
µ
τ
>kA. (49)
Sufﬁcient condition
A straightforward calculation shows that:
∂G
∂²
(v,²)=−e−A(v−I)
·
Aµ−τ
θ0
θ2(1+ Aθ)+ Aτ
θ0
θ2v
¸
.
53It follows that G(v,²) is decreasing in v over the entire range of possible values if and only if
Aµ>τ
θ0
θ2(1+ Aθ),
that is, if and only if
µ
τ
>
θ0
θ
µ
1+
1
Aθ
¶
. (50)
From (49) and (50) it follows that
kA >
θ0
θ
µ
1+
1
Aθ
¶
(51)
is sufﬁcient to ensure that the optimal policy is of the two-threshold type.
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